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YIELDING TO THE NECESSITIES OF A GREAT PUBLIC
INDUSTRY: DENIAL AND CONCEALMENT OF THE
HARMFUL HEALTH EFFECTS OF COAL MINING
CAITLYN GREENE* & PATRICK CHARLES MCGINLEY**
[M]ere private personal inconveniences . . . must yield to
the necessities of a great public industry, which, although
in the hands of a private corporation, subserves a great
public interest.
–Pa. Coal v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886)
INTRODUCTION
In the mid-nineteenth century, coal mined in Central Appalachia
began to flow into industrial markets.1 Those mines and the coal they
produced provided jobs, put food on family tables in coalfield households,
and even provided housing for hundreds of thousands of coal miners and
their families.2 The bounty from America’s expanding coalfields fueled
the Industrial Revolution and powered the nation’s steel mills, factories,
* Duke Environmental Health Scholar and Managing Editor, Duke Environmental Law
& Policy Forum (2017–18); Duke University, JD (2018); LL.M Editor Journal of Food
Law & Policy, University of Arkansas; LL.M. in Agricultural and Food Law University
of Arkansas (expected 2019).
** Judge Charles H. Haden II Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law.
Prof. McGinley acknowledges the support of the College of Law and the Hodges Research
Fund and the excellent research assistance of Amanda Demmerle (W. Va. Univ., JD,
expected 2020) and Kristin E. Ross (W. Va. Univ., JD 2014).
1 The coal-producing regions of Central Appalachia include southern West Virginia,
Eastern Kentucky, the westernmost tip of Virginia, and East Tennessee. See Jedediah
Purdy, The Violent Remaking of Appalachia, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.
theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/03/the-violent-remaking-ofappalachia/474603/
[https://perma.cc/GXB7-PN5R] (“Central Appalachia’s history is the story of coal. At its
peak in the mid-20th century, mining employed more than 150,000 people in West
Virginia alone, mostly in the state’s otherwise poor and rugged counties.”). The broader
Appalachia region includes thirteen states from southern New York to northern Mis-
sissippi. See The Appalachian Region, APPALACHIAN REG’L COMM’N, https://www.arc.gov/ap
palachian_region/theappalachianregion.asp [https://perma.cc/WF9A-NPQ9] (last visited
Apr. 3, 2019).
2 The Coal Town System, PUB. BROAD. SERV., https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperi
ence/features.minewars-coalcamps/ [https://perma.cc/B7AG-E8ZB] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019).
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steamboats, and railroads.3 It powered America’s defense through two
World Wars and later military conflicts.4 Coal-fired power plants gener-
ated more than half of the electricity used in the United States in the
latter quarter of the twentieth century.5
In her definitive book on the subject, Coal: A Human History,
Barbara Freese observes that in many ways the mineral could be viewed
as a gift from God that produced undeniable good—as well as evil health
and environmental externalities.6 Coal’s Jekyll-and-Hyde-like qualities
have long been demonstrable and well-known where coal is mined.7
Outside of coal country, however, coal’s dark side has largely escaped
public attention.8
For well over one hundred years, American courts, politicians,
and community leaders often gave an approving nod to the positive
economic contributions of the coal industry while turning a blind eye to
coal’s many harmful externalities.9 In an 1886 opinion of the Supreme
3 Gregory Clark & David Jacks, Coal and the Industrial Revolution, 1700–1869, 11 EUR.
REV. ECON. HIST. 39, 39–40, 43–44 (2007).
4 Raymond E. Murphy, Wartime Changes in the Patterns of United States Coal Pro-
duction, 37 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 185, 185 (1947).
5 John Muyskens et al., Mapping how the United States generates its electricity, WASH.
POST (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/power-plants
/?utm_term=.735a929d2d6d [https://perma.cc/UG22-LWWZ].
6 Freese observes that
[t]o see coal purely as a gift from God overlooks the many dangerous
strings attached to that gift. Similarly, to see it as just an environ-
mental evil would be to overlook the undeniable good that accompanies
that evil. Failing to recognize both sides of coal—the vast power and the
exorbitant costs—misses the essential, heartbreaking drama of the story.
BARBARA FREESE, COAL: A HUMAN HISTORY 12–13 (2003).
7 See Patrick C. McGinley, Climate Change and the War On Coal: Exploring the Dark
Side, 13 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 255, 257–58 (2012).
8 Id. The lack of public awareness extends to diverse negative coal mining externalities:
The public is generally oblivious to coal’s negative impacts on the en-
vironment, including soil erosion, landslides, sulfuric acid water pollution,
stream sedimentation, and loss of potable water. They are also unaware
of the workplace injuries, diseases, and fatalities associated with coal
mining. Nor is the public aware of coal’s socio-economic impacts, which
include: family and community disruption; economic stagnation; and
accompanying lack of educational, employment, and economic develop-
ment opportunities.
Id. at 265.
9 See Robinson Meyer, Coal’s Devastation, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www
.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/08/coals-externalities-medical-air-quality-finan
cial-environmental/401075/ [https://perma.cc/D2PU-S3SN].
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Court of Pennsylvania,10 Pennsylvania Coal v. Sanderson, the court
cavalierly dismissed the pleas of a family whose property and livelihood
had been despoiled by the polluting acid coal mine drainage pumped
from a nearby mine into a stream that traversed their farm11:
The plaintiff’s grievance, is for a mere personal inconve-
nience, and we are of opinion that mere private personal
inconveniences, arising in this way and under such cir-
cumstances, must yield to the necessities of a great public
industry, which although in the hands of a private corpo-
ration, subserves a great public interest. To encourage the
development of the great natural resources of a country,
trifling inconveniences to particular persons must some-
times give way to the necessities of a great community.12
More than a century later, a broad expanse of coal-related “trifling incon-
veniences” have been fully documented. A New York Academy of Sci-
ences analysis emphasized the economic costs of coal externalities:
Each stage in the life cycle of coal—extraction, transport,
processing, and combustion—generates a waste stream
and carries multiple hazards for health and the environ-
ment. These costs are external to the coal industry and are
thus often considered “externalities.” We estimate that the
life cycle effects of coal and the waste stream generated
10 Pa. Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 143 (1886). Mrs. Sanderson sued the coal
company to recover damages caused by pollution of the stream. According to the court,
the plaintiff was induced to purchase a tract of land on Meadow Creek in the Anthracite
coal region because of “[t]he existence of the stream, the purity of its water, and its utility
for domestic and other purposes . . . .” Mr. and Mrs. Sanderson built a house on the land
constructed dams across the stream to form a fish and ice pond and to supply a cistern
that in turn provided potable water for domestic purposes and for a fountain. Id.
11 The court characterized Mrs. Sanderson’s injuries:
It is alleged that the large volume of mine water, which the defendants
poured into the Meadow brook, has corrupted the water of that stream
to such an extent as to render it totally unfit for domestic use; that the
fish in the brook have been totally destroyed, the plaintiff’s pipes cor-
roded and her entire apparatus for the utilization of the water rendered
wholly worthless; and that, in consequence, about the year 1875, the
same was abandoned.
Id.
12 Id. at 149.
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are costing the U.S. public a third to over one-half of a tril-
lion dollars annually. Many of these so-called externalities
are, moreover, cumulative. Accounting for the damages con-
servatively doubles to triples the price of electricity from
coal per kWh generated, making wind, solar, and other
forms of nonfossil fuel power generation, along with in-
vestments in efficiency and electricity conservation methods,
economically competitive.13
The coal industry and its supporters have consistently denied and
minimized the impact of the adverse economic and health impacts of
mining.14 The following discussion will examine two examples of coal’s
externalities that the industry has disputed or denied, despite evidence
of serious public health concerns.
The first example relates to black lung disease.15 Since the earli-
est days of the last century, coal companies and their agents denied that
inhaled coal dust caused black lung disease. Then, when the denial could
no longer withstand the weight of science and logic, the industry fought at
every turn to avoid government regulation of miner exposure to the lethal
airborne coal dust in mine work places.16 Beyond opposing regulation, the
13 Paul R. Epstein et al., Full Cost Accounting for the Life Cycle of Coal, 119 ANNALS N.Y.
ACAD. SCI. 73, 73 (2011).
14 Patrick McGinley, Collateral Damage: Turning a Blind Eye to Environmental and
Social Injustice in The Coalfields, 19 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 304, 312 (2013)
[hereinafter Collateral Damage] (“As it has for a century, the coal industry’s response to
the demonstrable negative externalized costs of coal is to deny and/or minimize, while
ignoring demands that these costs be internalized.”).
15 “Black lung disease” is the common colloquial name used in lieu of the medical term
“coal workers’ pneumoconiosis.” Pathologists who observe lungs of diseased miners report
they appear black, instead of the natural pink color of healthy lung tissue. About Black
Lung Disease, LUNGS AT WORK, https://lungsatworkpa.org/?page_id=53 [https://perma.cc
/6NT7-2A5L] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019).
16 ALAN DERICKSON, BLACK LUNG: ANATOMY OF A PUBLIC HEALTH DISASTER 54, 64, 70, 99,
108, 173 (1998). See James L. Weeks & Gregory R. Wagner, Compensation for occupational
disease with multiple causes: the case of coal miners’ respiratory diseases, 76 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 58, 59 (1986). Weeks and Wagner explain:
“Black lung” is the common or popular term used to refer to occupa-
tional respiratory disease among miners. Imprecise and non-technical,
it reflects what miners and their families have known and experienced
for decades and what the emerging medical literature in this field
supports, namely, that coal miners are at risk for a wide spectrum of
lung diseases caused by their occupational exposures. Black lung is not
referred to in medical text books except with disdain.
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industry denied any responsibility or liability as thousands of its own
employees were afflicted by the disabling and often fatal pulmonary dis-
ease.17 Today, despite concrete evidence that the incidence of black lung
disease is increasing at an alarming rate, the coal industry’s now-familiar
response is to deny the need for additional regulatory efforts to protect
miners’ lives.18
The second example of health concerns arising from coal mining
operations focuses on so-called “mountaintop removal” coal strip mining
(“MTR”).19 For two decades, people living in close proximity to large
Appalachian MTR strip mines have expressed serious concerns about
MTR’s health impacts. Those concerns have intensified over the last decade
as peer-reviewed epidemiology studies have identified correlations be-
tween MTR operations and negative public health outcomes.20 Affected
communities fear that exposure to mining-generated air and water pol-
lution has caused a disproportionate range of serious illnesses and dis-
eases in contrast to non-mining communities of the region that the studies
show are not similarly situated.21
Id. For a remarkably jaundiced review of the struggle of miners and their medical care
providers to force recognition of “black lung” as an occupational disease caused by in-
halation of respirable coal dust in underground coal mines, see Daniel M. Fox & Judith
F. Stone, Black Lung: Miners’ Militancy and Medical Uncertainty, 1968–1972, 54 BULLETIN
HIST. MED. 43, 43 (1980).
17 Ken Ward, Jr., WV groups hope study leads to end of mountaintop removal mining,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (May 23, 2017), https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/special
_reports/wv-groups-hope-study-leads-to-end-of-mountaintop-removal/article_8cdfd973
-99fe-5462-8338-a2aa7c8998ba.html [https://perma.cc/N5HK-Q5P3] (“[M]ore than two-
dozen peer-reviewed papers . . . raised serious questions about increased risk of cancer,
birth defects and premature death among coalfield residents living near large-scale surface
coal-mining operations.”). See also Press Release, Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation
& Enforcement, OSMRE Funds National Academy of Sciences Study of Potential Health
Risks Related to Surface Coal Mining in Central Appalachia (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www
.osmre.gov/resources/newsroom/news/2016/080316.pdf [https://perma.cc/4D2G-AG89].
18 Sarah Jones, Congress Is Giving the Coal Industry a Break, and Sick Miners May Pay
the Price, N.Y. MAG. (Dec. 16, 2018), https://flipboard.com/@NYMag/congress-is-giving-the
-coal-industry-a-break-and-sick-miners-may-pay-the-price/f-9dc9e68c9b%2Fnymag.com
[https://perma.cc/F623-YLD9].
19 Community Impacts of Mountaintop Removal, APPALACHIAN VOICES, http://appvoices
.org/end-mountaintop-removal/community/ [https://perma.cc/483B-ZYDX] (last visited
Apr. 3, 2019).
20 Richard Schiffman, A Troubling Look at the Human Toll of Mountaintop Removal
Mining, YALEENVIRONMENT360 (Nov. 21, 2017), https://e360.yale.edu/features/a-troubling
-look-at-the-human-toll-of-mountaintop-removal-mining [https://perma.cc/M8M9-T526].
Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation & Enforcement, supra note 17.
21 Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation & Enforcement, supra note 17.
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Consistent with coal industry management’s historic proclivity for
denial and deflection of its negative externalities, coal interests not only
reject epidemiologists’ investigations and findings of correlations between
coal mining and public health impacts, they also strongly opposed a $1 mil-
lion government-funded study of possible causal links between MTR
operations and adverse health impacts experienced by those who live and
work nearby.22 As discussed below, instead of supporting objective unbi-
ased scientific analysis, to allay community concerns, the industry and
its supporters have turned again to denial, attacking the science, the
scientists, and black lung victims.
These two examples provide a useful lens to examine concerns
about the impact of coal mining practices on the health of coal miners
and the communities where they live and work. Ironically, the federal
Mine Safety and Health Act declares that “[t]he first priority and concern
of all in the coal mining industry must be the health and safety of its most
precious resource—the miner.”23 Those words ring hollow today, as coal
miners and their communities continue to bear the burden of disabling
lung afflictions and a plethora of illnesses and diseases. Degraded health
is not a natural consequence of working in or living near a coal mine.
Disease and illnesses arising from exposure to environmental contaminants
are preventable. In this Article we argue that, in Central Appalachia,
objective science and strict enforcement of occupational and environmen-
tal laws must be the first priority of industry and government regulators.
I. COAL MINING HISTORY AND METHODS
A. History
Coal mining began in Central Appalachia as early as 1810, though
it was known that coal was present in the region as early as the mid-
1700s.24 Professor Ronald Eller described the region prior to the Indus-
trial Revolution:
22 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Letter from Hal Quinn, President and CEO of Nat’l Mining
Assoc. to Human Rights Watch, in THE COAL MINE NEXT DOOR: HOW THE US GOV-
ERNMENT’S DEREGULATION OF MOUNTAINTOP REMOVAL THREATENS PUBLIC HEALTH app.
3–4(Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/uscoal1218_web2
.pdf [https://perma.cc/FD4J-5TBV]. The National Academy of Science study of possible health
impacts of MTR mining was “a very expensive waste of taxpayer dollars.” Id. at 66.
23 30 U.S.C. § 801(a) (2018).
24 History of West Virginia Mineral Industries—Coal, W. VA. GEOLOLOGICAL & ECON.
SURVEY (June 20, 2017), http://www.wvgs.wvnet.edu/www/geology/geoldvco.htm [https://
perma.cc/H9XC-D3ZY].
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Great forests of oak, ash, and poplar covered the hillsides
with a rich blanket of deep hues, and clear, sparkling
streams rushed along the valley floors. No railroad had
yet penetrated the hollows. The mountain people lived in
small settlements scattered here and there in the valleys
and coves. Life on the whole was simple, quiet, and devoted
chiefly to agricultural pursuits.25
The coming of the industrial age awakened the coalfields of Appalachia.26
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the quiet mountain life of the
Central Appalachian coalfields vanished.27 Agrarian subsistence farming
declined precipitously as men, and even boys, trekked to coal mines
seeking work underground.28 Job-seekers from other regions of the coun-
try, including poor African American sharecroppers from the South and
newly arrived immigrants from Europe, fueled the rapid change in Ap-
palachian life and culture.29
Thousands of miners toiled in oppressive, serf-like conditions in
“coal camps” in the anthracite coalfields of northeastern Pennsylvania
and the bituminous coalfields that spread across America.30 Miners and
their families found food and shelter in these company-built-and-owned
towns situated in remote valleys and hollows of Central Appalachia—
which had essentially been, hitherto, a remote wilderness unblemished
by roads and rail lines.31
“In addition to owning and controlling all of the institutions in the
town, coal company rule . . . included the company doctor who delivered
the babies, the mines in which the children went to work, and the ceme-
teries where they eventually were buried.”32 From the houses in which
25 RONALD D. ELLER, MINERS, MILLHANDS, AND MOUNTAINEERS: INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE
APPALACHIAN SOUTH, 1880–1930 161 (1st ed., 1982).
26 McGinley, supra note 7, at 266.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Heidi Taylor-Caudil & Whitney Hays, Immigrants in the Coalfields, UNIV. OF KY.,
http://iia.uky.edu/immigrantsinthecoalfields [https://perma.cc/53VD-AD77] (last visited
Apr. 3, 2019).
30 Patrick C. McGinley, From Pick and Shovel to Mountaintop Removal: Environmental
Injustice in the Appalachian Coalfields, 34 ENVTL. L. 21, 26–27, 29 (2004).
31 Eileen Mountjoy, Ernest: Life in a Mining Town, IND. UNIV. PA., https://www.iup.edu
/archives/coal/people-lives-stories/ernest–life-in-a-mining-town/ [https://perma.cc/7ME3
-N7AV] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019).
32 THE WEST VIRGINIA MINE WARS: AN ANTHOLOGY 1 (David Alan Corbin ed., 1990).
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miners and their families lived, to the store where they bought food, to
the schools and the churches, the recreation facilities, and everything in
between, the coal company controlled it all.33
Workers were paid in “scrip,” a private form of currency issued by
the company that was accepted only by company-owned-and-operated
stores and businesses.34 This form of compensation was problematic,
placing miners further under the thumb of company bosses and making
it nearly impossible to accumulate savings which could be used outside
the camp limits.35 Coal companies essentially had complete and total
domination over the lives of the camps’ inhabitants, and they wielded
this power with little government oversight.36
Neither the health of miners nor the quality of life in the coal
camps was of significant priority or concern for most coal company mana-
gers. Appalachian historian Ronald Eller drew a bleak picture of these
benighted communities:
Coal-mining village after coal-mining village dotted the hol-
lows along every creek and stream. The weathered houses
of those who worked in the mines lined the creeks and steep
slopes, and the black holes themselves gaped from the hill-
sides like great open wounds. Mine tipples, headhouses,
and other buildings straddled the slopes of the mountains.
Railroads sent their tracks in all directions, and long lines
of coal cars sat on the sidings and disappeared around the
curves of the hills.
The once majestic earth was scarred and ugly, and the
streams ran brown with garbage and acid runoff from the
mines. A black dust covered everything. Huge mounds of
coal and “gob” piles of discarded mine waste lay about.
33 Southern West Virginia Coal Fields, COAL CAMP USA, http://coalcampusa.com/sowv/in
dex.htm [https://perma.cc/UY4H-8M2P] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019).
34 DAVID ALAN CORBIN, LIFE, WORK, AND REBELLION IN THE COALFIELDS: THE SOUTHERN
WEST VIRGINIA MINERS, 1880–1922 10 (1981) (“[T]he miner paid monopolistic prices for his
goods . . . . To the miners, it meant, as they later sang, that they ‘owed their souls to the com-
pany store.’ For some miners, it meant being held in peonage.”). Id. See also Keokee
Consol. Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U.S. 224, 226–27 (1914) (upholding law prohibiting mining
companies from issuing scrip).
35 CORBIN, supra note 34, at 10.
36 McGinley, supra note 30, at 28.
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The peaceful quiet of three decades before had been re-
placed by a cacophony of voices and industrial sounds.37
While Appalachian coal powered the Industrial Revolution, it was also
transforming the culture and landscape of the region.
B. Central Appalachian Coalfield Population Growth
From 1900 to 1950, the influx of workers, their families, and
others employed in a variety of enterprises supporting the coal industry
resulted in a huge expansion in the Central Appalachian population.38 At
its peak in 1923, the U.S. coal industry employed 862,536 miners; in
1948, the post-WWII mine work force numbered 507,333.39 Twenty years
later, 134,467 workers were employed in the mines.40 From 1968 to 1978,
a coal boom pushed coal mine employment to 255,588.41 Seven years
later, in 1985, 197,049, or 75,000 fewer workers, toiled in U.S. mines.42
Although coal production continued to increase, only 132,111 miners were
employed in 1995.43 By December 2018, coal jobs had shrunk to approxi-
mately 54,000 workers.44
37 ELLER, supra note 25, at 161–62 (describing life in an early coal camp in Central
Appalachia).
38 Christopher Price, The Impact of the Mechanization of the Coal Mining Industry on the
Population and Economy of Twentieth Century West Virginia, 22 W. VA. HIST. SOC’Y 1,
4 (2008). For example, the population of counties located in the Central Appalachian
coalfields of southern West Virginia grew dramatically as mines proliferated and coal
production exploded. From 1900 to 1950, the population of Logan County grew from 6,955
to 77,391—an increase of more than 1,000%; McDowell County’s 1900 population of 18,747
increased by 1950 to 98,887, or more than 400%; Raleigh County’s population of 12,346 grew
to 96,273. Id. at 11. Exemplars of the Central Appalachian coal region, the same counties lost
population with the onset of mechanization and loss of energy market share since 1950.
Today, McDowell County’s population is 18,456, Raleigh County 75,022, and Logan County
32,925. Population of Counties in West Virginia (2019), WORLD POP. REV., http://worldpop
ulationreview.com/us-counties/wv/ [https://perma.cc/YM84-QZNK] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019).
39 Coal Fatalities for 1900 Through 2018, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://arlweb.msha.gov





44 All Employees: Mining and Logging: Coal Mining, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS, https://
fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CEU1021210001#0 [https://perma.cc/8QK4-RUK9] (last visited
Apr. 3, 2019); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 39. See also New data chart on mine
employment and coal production 1978–2015, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, MINE SAFETY HEALTH
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With mechanization came higher levels of production using sig-
nificantly less manpower—resulting in higher profits with less overhead.45
C. Mining Methodologies
1. Mining Prior to Mechanization
The twentieth century saw coal mining evolve from labor-inten-
sive, pick-and-shovel digging to modern, high-tech, mechanized mining.46
Coal was mined from the late nineteenth century until the 1920s using
primitive methods, employing men and boys wielding picks and hand-load-
ing by shovels, blasting apart coal beds, and hauling coal to the surface
in carts pulled on rails by horses or mules.47 The mining was done using
the “room and pillar technique,” which involves extracting coal while leav-
ing pillars of coal to prevent the overlying strata from collapsing into the
area (“room”) as coal was removed.48
ADMIN., https://wvpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/5/SWWV2012_091912.pdf [https://
perma.cc/L2R7-LR3E] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019). W. VA. CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y, THE
STATE OF WORKING WEST VIRGINIA 2012 24 (Sept. 2012), https://wvpolicy.org/wp-content
/uploads/2018/5/SWWV2012_091912.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9X8-Y2ES].
45 See infra note 94.
46 VACLAV SMIL, TRANSFORMING THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: TECHNICAL INNOVATIONS AND
THEIR CONSEQUENCES 159–62 (2006).
47 See, e.g.,OHIO DEP’T NAT. RES., GEOFACTS NO. 14: HISTORY OF COAL MINING IN OHIO 1–2
(2008), http://minerals.ohiodnr.gov/portals/minerals/pdf/coal/geof14.pdf [https://perma
.cc/VUS9-788Q] (However, “[b]y the 1930’s, many of Ohio’s underground coal mines had
become fully mechanized with the introduction of coal-loading machinery”).
48 Room and pillar mining involves:
extract[ing] the coal by cutting a series of rooms into the coalbed and
leaving pillars . . . of coal, to help support the mine roof. As mining
advances, a grid-like pattern is formed in the panel of coal, which is
about 400 feet wide and more than half a mile long. Generally, the rooms
are 20 to 30 feet wide and the pillars 20 to 90 feet wide; the height
usually is the same as the coalbed thickness. When mining reaches the
end of the panel, the direction of mining usually is reversed. During
this “retreat” phase of mining the miners recover as much coal as possible
from the pillars in a systematic manner until the roof caves in. When this
phase of mining is completed, the area is abandoned. Generally, 50 to
60 percent of the minable coal [in a seam] is recovered with room-and-
pillar mining.
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., COAL DATA: A REFERENCE 10–11 (1995), http://webapp1.dlib
.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/4265704/FID3754/pdf/Coal_nuc/006493.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q285-E3H9].
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2. Continuous Mining
In the 1940s, mechanized “continuous mining” was introduced in
American mines.49 “Continuous mining uses a machine called the ‘continu-
ous miner’ that combines cutting, drilling, and loading coal into one opera-
tion and requires no blasting.”50 During the late 1940s, conventional
techniques began to be replaced by these single machines, which broke
off the coal from the seam and transferred it back to the haulage sys-
tem.51 The new equipment was adapted for and used with the room-and-
pillar method.52
As mines were mechanized after the Second World War, coal
production increased dramatically, while the number of miners dropped
appreciably.53 As discussed below, after reaching their post-WWII zenith
49 KEITH DIX, WHAT’S A COAL MINER TO DO?: THE MECHANIZATION OF COAL MINING 77
(1988).
50 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 48, at 11. For an overview of changing mining
methods, see generally JOEL DARMSTADTER, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE
IN U.S. COAL MINING (July 1997), https://www.rff.org/documents/1097/RFF-DP-97-40.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8F7R-GPYA].
51 NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., ENG’G & MED., MONITORING AND SAMPLING APPROACHES TO ASSESS
UNDERGROUND COAL MINE DUST EXPOSURES, APP. F, UNDERGROUND COAL MINING METH-
ODS AND ENGINEERING DUST CONTROLS 130 (2018) (“A continuous miner is used for cutting
and loading and shuttle cars to transport coal from the miner to the intermediate haulage.”).
52 Id. at 130–32.
53 INGRID H. RIMA, LABOR MARKETS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: AN INTRODUCTION 228 (1996).
A 1947 publication reported how U.S. mines in the early twentieth century experienced
an enormous increase in coal production. “[I]n the year 1923, 1,880,000 tons of bituminous
coal were produced by mechanized mines; by 1931, the bituminous coal produced by mecha-
nized mining had reached 47,562,000 tons, a growth of 25 fold in [eight] years.” TECHNO-
CRATIC STUDY COURSE, TECHNOCRACY INC. 116 (online ed. 2005), https://www.technocracy
inc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Study-Course.pdf [https://perma.cc/A97W-XDY4]. The
same publication also mentioned how the industry had witnessed a per worker-hour
increase over the preceding century:
The best available data indicate that 100 years ago [1847], one man could
not mine on the average more than a ton of coal in one day of 12 hours;
in other words, it took 12 man-hours to mine one ton of coal. In the in-
dustrial growth that followed, the coal mining industry . . . produced
670 million tons of coal in one year. During all this period, . . . we im-
proved our coal mining technique. First steam pumps and power hoists
were introduced; then blowing engines for the ventilation of the mines;
explosives were used for breaking the coal and rendering [easier] its
extraction. Later, coal cutting machines and automatic loaders were
introduced. More recently, large scale strip mining methods have been
employed where giant steam shovels of 30 and 40 tons per bucket full
strip off the overlying rock to depths of 50 or 60 feet . . . . Figured on
the basis of coal mined, the average rate of production of all the coal
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of 507,000 miners in 1948, the number of miners steadily declined.54 In
2017, the total number of coal miners in the United States had fallen to
a low of 53,051.55 At the state level, for example, there were 13,222 miners
working in West Virginia in 2017.56 Today, slightly more than 12,000 peo-
ple are employed in coal mining in West Virginia.57
3. Contour Strip Mining
Two types of surface coal mining techniques were used from the
late 1930s in Central Appalachia until the turn of the millennium to
strip shallow-lying coal: contour mining and auger mining.58 Professor
Mark Squillace has summarized the aggregate environmental impact of
strip mining prior to the time of enactment of the federal Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (“SMCRA”):
[When] SMCRA was passed in 1977, more than 264,000
acres of cropland, 135,000 acres of pasture, and 127,800
acres of forest had been lost. More than 11,000 miles of
streams had been polluted by sediment or acid from sur-
face and underground mining combined. Some 29,000 acres
mined in the United States is approximately six tons per man per
eight-hour day. Stated in terms of man-hours, this means that it now
takes eight man-hours on the average to mine [six] tons of coal, whereas,
100 years ago it required twelve man-hours to mine one ton of coal.
Thus, the man-hours required per ton of coal mined has declined since
1830 from 12 to 1.33 man-hours per ton of coal.
Id. at 115. In 2003, U.S. coal miners produced an average of nearly seven tons per worker
hour. Annual Energy Review, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 12, 2012), https://www.eia
.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/showtext.php?t=ptb0707 [https://perma.cc/C4L6-HLRH].
54 G.E. Harding, American Coal Production and Use, 22 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 46, 47–48 (1946).
55 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL COAL REPORT 2017 27 (2017), https://www.eia.gov
/coal/annual/pdf/acr.pdf [https://perma.cc/LB6J-J53F].
56 Id.
57 Between 1948 and 1961, the number of miners employed in West Virginia fell from
117,000 to 42,000. Though mechanization and modern high-production mining methods
resulted in record tonnage, employment plummeted, as did the Central Appalachian
coalfield population. By 2017, only 12,606 miners were working in the state, and coal
production plunged from a record 181,914,000 tons in 1997 to 105,000,000 in 2017.
58 For a summary explanation of surface mining methodology, see Basic Information
about Surface Coal Mining in Appalachia, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa
.gov/sc-mining/basic-information-about-surface-coal-mining-appalachia [https://perma.cc
/2BEU-BRYF] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019). For a more detailed description of surface mining
methods used in Central Appalachia and other mining regions, see MARK SQUILLACE,
THE STRIP MINE HANDBOOK 16–19 (2d. ed. 2009).
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of reservoirs and impoundments had been seriously dam-
aged by strip mining. Strip mining had created at least
3,000 miles of landslides and left some 34,000 miles of high-
walls [of which, twenty thousand miles of abandoned high-
walls exist in Appalachia alone]. Two-thirds of the land
that had been mined for coal had been left unreclaimed, and
the cost of reclamation in 1977 was estimated at between
$10 billion and $35 billion. . . . The most serious adverse im-
pacts from coal mining have occurred in the Appalachian
region, especially the states of Kentucky, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia . . . .59
State laws, if they existed at all, were weak and largely unen-
forced.60 The land, water, and general environment of the region suffered
enormous damage for decades.61 Chad Montrie captured the cumulative
impact of unregulated coal mining:
Surface coal mining has dramatically impacted communi-
ties in the Appalachian coalfields. As the industry expanded
in the years after World War II, it exacerbated the poverty
and chronic unemployment of the region, compounding the
impoverishment that was a legacy of other extractive eco-
nomic activities, including deep mining.62
59 SQUILLACE, supra note 58, at 7–8 (citing various sources including: S. REP. NO. 95-128,
95th Cong.1st Sess. 50 (1977); H.R. REP. NO. 95-218, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 135 (1977); H.R.
REP. NO. 94-1445, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 19, 135 (1976); FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATE-
MENT, PERMANENT REGULATORY PROGRAM, OSM EIS-l.p. Bill-17 (1979); U.S. DEP’T. OF THE
INTERIOR, SURFACE MINING AND OUR ENVIRONMENT 42, 54, 85 (USGPO. 1967-0-258-263)).
60 See John D. Edgcomb, Comment, Cooperative Federalism and Environmental Protec-
tion: The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 58 TUL. L. REV. 299, 305–08
(1983) (describing state efforts in West Virginia, Virginia, Kentucky, and Ohio). See also
McGinley, supra note 30, at 49.
61 RONALD D. ELLER, UNEVEN GROUND: APPALACHIA SINCE 1945 37 (2013) (“Surface min-
ing . . . left the mountains disfigured and the environment altered in ways previously
unimagined in the region. . . . The social cost of the new industry was as appalling as the
cost to the land itself.”).
62 CHAD MONTRIE, TO SAVE THE LAND AND PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF OPPOSITION TO SURFACE
COAL MINING IN APPALACHIA 2 (2003). Eventually, when Congress enacted comprehensive
regulation to ameliorate the many harmful externalities of unregulated coal mining it
identified the magnitude of the environmental and socio-economic harm that accrued as
a result of coal mining up to 1977. H.R. REP. NO. 95-218, at 58–59 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 539, 596–97 (detailing the devastating consequences of surface mining that
galvanized Congressional action on SMCRA).
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Coalfield residents took notice and reacted—at first, locally, but soon the
movement began to spread across the region.63 People from Central Appa-
lachian communities began to coordinate to form a loose grassroots move-
ment, demanding cessation of the environmental degradation caused by
both strip mining and underground mining.64 Key to their plan of action
was their call for Congress to intervene and establish uniform national
coal mining and reclamation standards that could be enforceable in court
by federal and state regulators, as well as through legislatively autho-
rized “citizen suits.”65
“The contour method is used almost exclusively in the steep
Appalachian region of the United States where coal seams outcrop from
the sides of hills or mountains.”66 Contour mining makes cuts on the
slope where the coal seam is located; trees, vegetation, and the soil and
rock overburden are removed first, and then the coal itself.67 Overburden
from adjacent cuts is used to fill previous cuts; the operator continues
making cuts until the ratio of overburden to coal becomes uneconomical.68
The mining operation then continues along the contour of the mountain
until the coal resources, or the operator’s resources, are exhausted.69
Contour mining uses relatively small earth-moving equipment, including
power shovels, backhoes, and bulldozers, similar to equipment used for
many other kinds of construction activities.70 Contour mining was the
63 STEPHEN L. FISHER, FIGHTING BACK IN APPALACHIA: TRADITIONS OF RESISTANCE AND
CHANGE 6–7 (1993) (“The grassroots anti-strip mining movement was at the heart of the
initial outburst of community organizing in Appalachia in the latter half of the 1960s and
early 1970s”). See generally MONTRIE, supra note 62 (describing the history of this citi-
zens movement).
64 See generally MONTRIE, supra note 62. This book provides a comprehensive chronicle
of the history of coalfield citizens’ movement, the enactment of SMCRA, and the subse-
quent effect of the legislation on Appalachian communities and lands.
65 Citizen suits are authorized by the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 520, 91 Stat. 503 (1977) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 1270).
See Edward M. Green et al., The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977:
New Era of Federal-State Cooperation or Prologue to Future Controversy?, 16 E. MINERAL
L. INST., 392, 392 (1996).
66 SQUILLACE, supra note 58, at 18. ELLER, supra note 61, at 36–37 (“In the mountains . . .
surface miners were forced to follow the contour of the coal seam as it wound around the
mountainside. Contour mining removed the soil and rock from above the seam, gauging
a shelf around the hillside to get at the coal below . . . The practice of contour mining cut
into the hillsides [creating] ugly scars that ran for miles along the ridges.”).
67 SQUILLACE, supra note 58, at 15.
68 Id. at 18.
69 Id.
70 Id.
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long-preferred strip-mining method in Central Appalachia.71 Contour min-
ing usually produced too much spoil upon completion of mining, so the spoil
was dumped in small tributary streams at the head of mountain hollows.72
When contour mining is performed in accordance with later re-
clamation laws, the coal operator is required to reduce the attendant
negative environmental externalities by using scrapers and loaders, or
bulldozers, to remove and then stockpile the topsoil for later use in re-
claiming the site.73 The exposed strata (“overburden”) is then drilled and
explosives are detonated to fragment it.74
Bulldozers, excavators, shovels, or draglines are used to uncover
the exposed coal seam.75 The mine operator then scoops and deposits the
coal into trucks or onto conveyor belts for transport, when necessary, to
a cleaning facility on site where shale and other non-combustible materials
are separated from marketable coal.76 SMCRA requires the overburden
or “spoil” removed during the mining process to be spread on a previously
mined area, where it will be graded and compacted, rather than cavalierly
dumped over steep hillsides.77 SMCRA also required, for the first time,
that overburden containing acid or alkaline materials be segregated and
specially handled to prevent water from percolating through it and cre-
ating polluted runoff or groundwater contamination.78
In Central Appalachia, before SMCRA was enacted, overburden
or spoil that remained after backfilling the area of coal removal had to
be placed somewhere on the mine site.79 The easiest and cheapest way
71 Id.
72 Id.
This results from a phenomenon called the swell factor. When overburden
is removed, it breaks up and loses some of the compaction that occurred
over the thousands of years that it laid undisturbed. Even after replace-
ment and mechanical compaction, the volume of the material increases
by up to 25%. The pits left after extracting the relatively thin coal seams
of the East are often not large enough to hold this added volume. As a
result, most contour miners must dispose of their excess spoil in another
fill or disposal area. The most common disposal areas are at the heads
of valleys, called valley filles or heads of hollow fills.
Id. at 18.




77 Id. at 139–41.
78 Id. at 70.
79 ELLER, supra note 61, at 36 (“This process not only left a forty-to-ninety foot ‘highwall’
exposed on the inside of the cut but pushed most of the dirt, rock, and tree stumps from
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was to push or shove it into a “fill” in narrow hollows at the top of valleys
carved over geologic time by small headwater tributaries.80 Under SMCRA,
fills are regulated and supposed to be engineered and constructed to pre-
vent environmental harm.81
Prior to SMCRA, coal operators seldom effectively revegetated the
mined area.82 More often than not, they made no sincere effort to do what
no law required, leaving the land ripe for soil erosion, landslides and
stream sedimentation.83 SMCRA established a regulated reclamation pro-
cess that required the coal company to spread the stored topsoil on the
surface and seed the area to ensure the establishment of a permanent
vegetative cover throughout the mined area.84
4. Auger Mining
Auger mining usually takes place in conjunction with contour
mining operations.85 The contour operator strips coal from the contour of
a mountain until the stripping ratio—the “ratio between the thickness
of the overburden and the coal seam”—makes it unprofitable to continue
contour mining.86 At that point, the operator may choose to maximize re-
covery of the coal by drilling (augering) holes into the exposed seam along
above the coal over the hillsides along the outer edges of the seam.”). See generally
SQUILLACE, supra note 58 (describing the environmental impacts of strip mining before
the passage of SMCRA).
80 SQUILLACE, supra note 58, at 99–101.
81 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(2–5), (22) (2018); see 30 C.F.R. §§ 816.71–816.74 (2018) (disposal of
excess spoil in valley fills/head-of-hollow fills, durable rock fills and on preexisting benches).
See SQUILLACE, supra note 58, at 99–101 (describing SMCRA’s requirements).
82 ELLER, supra note 61, at 37 (“Mining companies were required by law to replace the soil
and to replant the ravaged hillsides, but . . . [e]ven when meager efforts at reclamation were
undertaken, the absence of topsoil and the composition of the fill itself meant that little
vegetation grew on the disturbed site.”). See generally SQUILLACE, supra note 58 (describ-
ing the environmental impacts of strip mining before the passage of SMCRA).
83 Nathan Fetty, Modern Battles, in WRITTEN IN BLOOD: COURAGE AND CORRUPTION IN THE
APPALACHIAN WAR OF EXTRACTION 217 (Wess Harris ed., 2017) (“The early ‘shoot and
shove’ strip jobs of the mid-twentieth century sparked outrage in the communities where
the practice led to floods, landslides and other tragedies”).
84 SQUILLACE, supra note 58, at 134. The regulatory agency was required to document the
permanency of the vegetative cover over a five-year period before the company’s reclamation
bond would be released. Id. at 134–35. The actual effectiveness of this requirement, how-
ever, cannot be confirmed.
85 Robert Leopold et al., Surface Mining 21 (presented at the Nat’l Conf. on Appl. Tech. for
Analysis & Mgmt., Incline Village, Nevada, Apr. 23–25, 1979), https://www.fs.fed.us/psw
/publications/documents/psw_gtr035/psw_gtr035_01_leopold.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3WE
-U2SR] (“Auger mining is often performed in conjunction with contour strip mining”).
86 SQUILLACE, supra note 58, at 16.
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the contour of the highwall using an “auger machine.”87 “[I]t is an ex-
tremely wasteful technique . . . . [A]ugering coal may recover only 40 per
cent of the seam, leaving the remaining 60 per cent in a condition that
makes it unrecoverable by existing mining techniques.”88
These strip-mining methods have been eclipsed by the large-scale
MTR mining method.89 Today, contour and accompanying auger mining
produce a relatively small percentage of coal in Central Appalachia, having
been displaced by huge high-production mines, where coal is extracted
using the modern longwall-mining method underground and mountain-
top removal on the surface.90
5. Mega-Production Longwall and Mountaintop Removal Mining
Mechanization and the concomitant massive job losses attendant to
stripping operators’ embrace of mountaintop removal were paralleled by
the underground operators’ adoption of new deep mining technology.91
The new equipment and mining methods contributed to a significant
increase in worker productivity.92 Conversely, the increased efficiencies
of mechanized mining caused a dramatic decrease in the number of coal
mining jobs.93 In 1979, 58,565 miners produced 112.3 million tons of coal
87 Id. at 19. Tension cracks and other problems on the surface may result if auger holes
are not filled. See also David J. Kessler, Auger Mining, E-WV: THE WEST VIRGINIA EN-
CYCLOPEDIA (Dec. 14, 2010), https://www.wvencyclopedia.org/articles/312 [https://perma
.cc/FB2F-5W8Z]. Kessler explains:
Auger mining uses large-diameter drills mountain on mobile equipment
to bore into a coal seam. Holes are horizontally drilled at regular
intervals to depths of as much as 1,000 feet. As the cutting head of the
auger bites into the coalface, the cut coal is carried out by the screw
portion of the bit. Once the hole is mined to its required depth, the
auger machine is moved a few feet and another hole is drilled.
88 Leopold et al., supra note 85, at 21.
89 See generally SQUILLACE, supra note 58 (describing current mining practices). Jedediah
Purdy, The Violent Remaking of Appalachia, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www
.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/03/the-violent-remaking-of-appalachia/474603/
[https://perma.cc/83T2-FPUV] (“Today, contour mining seems almost artisinal. Since the
1990s, half the region’s coal has come from ‘mountaintop removal’ ”).
90 Purdy, supra note 89. Jen Alyse Arena, Coal production using mountaintop removal
mining decreases by 62% since 2008, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 7, 2015), https://www
.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=21952 [https://perma.cc/KSX3-L26Y] (“MTR is prevalent
mostly in Central Appalachia, specifically West Virginia, Kentucky, Virginia, . . . West
Virginia accounts for most domestic MTR production, and MTR production makes up
most of the surface production in the state (61% in 2013)”).
91 SQUILLACE, supra note 58, at 21–22.
92 See infra note 94.
93 Joel Darmstadter, Innovation and Productivity in U.S. Coal Mining, in PRODUCTIVITY
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in West Virginia; two decades later, 15,000 miners produced more than 160
million tons.94 As explained below, the new mining methods and equip-
ment caused more extensive environmental damage than was possible
by earlier mining methods.
6. Longwall Mining
In the decade and a half between 1975 and 1990, technological inno-
vations shifted conventional underground coal mining away from the
long-dominant continuous mining technology to “longwall” mining.95 Only
the largest companies could afford to invest in the new technology; cap-
ital costs for longwall mining are many times that required to operate a
mine that utilizes only continuous mining units to extract coal.96 Total
initial capital costs for a longwall unit in 1995 dollars were $13,738,000;
one continuous miner unit costs $1,835,000.97 Productivity of mines using
IN NATURAL RESOURCE INDUSTRIES: IMPROVEMENT THROUGH INNOVATION 48 (Ralph David
Simpson, ed., 1999). For example, coal production in West Virginia between 1975 and 2007
increased from 109,048,898 to 160,043,930 tons—or by more than 50%. Id. Many more
miners were employed in conventional continuous operations in underground room and
pillar mines employed as compared to longwall mines. Id. This can also be said with re-
gard to MTR mines, as huge mining equipment came to replace cadres of miners. The last
three decades has also witnessed a precipitous decline in non-union coal mine employ-
ment as coal companies have increasingly resisted unionization, even as corporate profits
have risen. ERIC ARNESEN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF U.S. LABOR AND WORKING-CLASS HISTORY
1432 (2007).
94 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL COAL REPORT 2010 (revised July 2012). It may be
that it is inaccurate to attribute increased productivity to new mining methods and equip-
ment because doing so fails to factor in externalized costs:
From a conceptual point of view, the questions arise as to whether, and
to what extent, some of the health-safety-environmental impacts of coal
mining fit the notion of “externalities”—at least for years preceding
statutory requirements for dealing with such problems (see below). That
is, were the costs of dealing with, or averting, these impacts borne by
society at large or the affected individuals rather than being financially
accounted for—“internalized”—in the operations of the mining firm? If
the former, output and productivity of the firm and of the industry
might, to some hard-to-quantify degree, be overstated because certain
costly damages from coal mining failed to be reflected as an offset to the
value of production.
Id. at 20.
95 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., EIA REPORT: LONGWALL MINING 3 (Mar. 1995), http://web
app1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/4265704/FID1578/pdf/coal_nuc/ [https://
perma.cc/5M3B-9MP6].
96 Id. at 5 (“Because a large initial capital outlay is required with no immediate return from
coal production . . . economics generally restricts longwall mining to large coal companies”).
97 Id. at 45.
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continuous miners is significantly lower than longwall mines.98 More-
over, the method uses only one-tenth of the workers required by continu-
ous mining.99
Longwall mining uses very sophisticated technology to carve huge
swaths, 1,500 feet wide and a mile or more long, through coal seams that
lie horizontally, hundreds of feet beneath the earth’s surface.100 A huge cir-
cular drum with cutting bits (the “shear”) cuts coal from the seam.101 The
shear, related equipment, and the miners operating them are protected
from roof cave-ins by overhead hydraulic shields (“roof supports”).102 The
roof supports move forward mechanically along the 1,000- to 1,500-foot-
wide longwall “face” as the shears cut into the coal103 that drops onto a
conveyer belt that runs parallel to the coal seam face.104 The conveyor
carries the newly cut coal out of the mine to the surface for processing and
transportation to market.105
As the supports move forward, the mine roof caves in, causing over-
lying strata to subside into the mined-out area.106 This subsidence radiates
upward and affects overlying surface land, water bodies, roads, homes, and
other structures.107 Coal mine subsidence has been defined as “the lowering
of strata overlying a coal mine, including the land surface, caused by the
extraction of underground coal.”108 The United States Supreme Court de-
scribed the harm that can accrue as a result of coal-mining-induced
surface subsidence in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis:
This lowering of the strata can have devastating effects. It
often causes substantial damage to foundations, walls,
other structural members, and the integrity of houses and
98 Id. (“productivity of the continuous miner units is also estimated to be much lower than
that of the longwalls . . . 575 raw tons per continuous miner unit shift versus 3,575 tons
per longwall unit shift . . . .”).
99 Collateral Damage, supra note 14, at 360.
100 McGinley, supra note 30, at 55–56, nn.179–80. See also BARLOW BURKE, JR. ET AL.,
MINERAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 316 (1994). See generally S.S. PENG & H.S. CHIANG,
LONGWALL MINING (1984) (describing this process).
101 McGinley, supra note 30, at 56–57.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 56 n.180.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 McGinley, supra note 30, at n.180.
108 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 474 (1976). The Court
upheld a Pennsylvania law prohibiting underground longwall and room and pillar mining
where the extraction of coal might harm important public interests. Id.
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buildings. Subsidence frequently causes sinkholes or
troughs in land which make the land difficult or impossible
to develop. Its effect on farming has been well
documented—many subsided areas cannot be plowed or
properly prepared. Subsidence can also cause the loss of
groundwater and surface ponds.109
Similarly, longwall subsidence has triggered pervasive loss and/or
contamination of rural domestic well and spring water supplies.110 While
some in the coal industry dispute the impact of longwall mining on water
resources, evidence of such effect is pervasive.111 Longwall mining, like
MTR, produces prodigious amounts of coal waste after mined material
is cleaned that, if not properly managed, can cause serious adverse im-
pacts both above and below the ground, as well as contaminate wells and
springs that often supply drinking water to the rural areas of Central
Appalachia.112
7. Mountaintop Removal
In the mid-1990s, MTR emerged in Central Appalachia as the domi-
nant method of surface mining, displacing contour mining, which now pro-
duces negligible coal tonnage by comparison.113 Conventional surface mine
operations in Central Appalachia typically cut hundreds of feet into moun-
tainsides but occurred “over relatively small spatial scales, [while MTR]
mines have been constructed across thousands of square kilometers of
109 Id. at 474–75.
110 For a discussion of the externalities of longwall coal mining, see SCHMID & CO., INC.,
CONSULTING ECOLOGISTS, THE INCREASING DAMAGE FROM UNDERGROUND COAL MINING
IN PENNSYLVANIA 25–27 (2011), http://www.schmidco.com/17April2011SchmidAct54Analy
sis.pdf [https://perma.cc/PAZ8-CXSL]; Colin J. Booth, Groundwater as an Environmental
Constraint of Longwall Mining, RMZ—MATERIALS & GEOENVIRONMENT 49, 49–52 (2003),
http://www.rmz-mg.com/letniki/rmz50/rmz50_0049-0052.pdf [https://perma.cc/QN34
-TL8F]. See generally U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 95.
111 T. Ty Lindberg et al., Cumulative impacts of mountaintop mining on an Appalachian
watershed, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 20,933 (Dec. 27, 2011), https://www.pnas.org/con
tent/pnas/108/52/20929.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3GG-D5NX] (“The waste rock from
these surface mines is disposed of in the adjacent river valleys, leading to a burial of
headwater streams and dramatic increases in salinity and trace metal concentrations im-
mediately downstream.”). See also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE EFFECTS OF MOUNTAIN-
TOP MINES AND VALLEY FILLS ON AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS OF THE CENTRAL APPALACHIAN
COALFIELDS 7 (Mar. 2011), https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/risk/recordisplay.cfm?deid=215267
[https://perma.cc/2YH8-4CTT].
112 McGinley, supra note 30, at 56, n.180.
113 Id. at 54–55.
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land, making it the single largest source of land use change in the re-
gion.”114 It has been estimated that MTR mining has disturbed “400
square miles of southern West Virginia mountains and ridges . . . and 1,000
miles of streams [have been] buried beneath debris blasted, shoved, and
dumped into narrow valleys.”115
MTR mining blasts through Appalachian ridges using explosives,
often in areas where longwall operations are occurring simultaneously un-
derground.116 “Explosives—equivalent to the power of one Hiroshima
bomb each week—are then used with draglines [and other equipment] to
blast and dig out the earth and expose the coal.117 “Normally 600 to 800
feet of mountaintop [ridges] are removed.”118 After blasting overburden,
surface soil, underlying strata, and coal are removed using twenty-story
tall “draglines.”119
One of the first media articles about MTR mining underscored the
difference between earlier, much smaller-scale strip mining technology
and MTR:
A new generation of motorized shovels and huge dump
trucks is being used to cut down entire mountaintops on
a scale unknown 25 years ago. This $100 million machine
weighs 8 million pounds and contains enough steel to build
2,700 cars. An enormous extension cord feeds it up to
$50,000 worth of electricity a month. The dragline’s bucket
could hold 26 Ford Escorts. It bites off 110 cubic yards of
earth in a single scoop.120
114 A. Pericak et al., Mapping the yearly extent of surface coal mining in Central Appalachia
using Landsat and Google Earth Engine 2, PLOS ONE (July 25, 2018), https://doi.org/10
.1371/journal.pone.0197758 [https://perma.cc/8DX5-LA9E].
115 McGinley, supra note 30, at 55.
116 Id.
117 Rene Cho, Mountaintop Removal: Laying Waste to Streams and Forests, EARTH INST.
(Aug. 11, 2011), https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2011/08/11/mountaintop-removal-laying
-waste-to-streams-and-forests/ [https://perma.cc/WRW6-38HQ].
118 Id.
119 McGinley, supra note 30, at 86.
120 See Penny Loeb, Shear Madness, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Aug. 3, 1997). See also
Peter Galuszka, Strip Mining On Steroids, BLOOMBERG BUS. WEEK (Nov. 17, 1997), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/1997-11-16/strip-mining-on-steroids [https://perma
.cc/95DU-8MEV]. See also Ken Ward, Jr., Industry, Critics Look for Mountaintop Removal
Alternative: Is There Another Way?, CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (June 6, 1999), https://wal
lacehouse.umich.edu/wp-content-uploads/2000/06/MountaintopReduced.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6G2Y-VP5V] (“In the early 1980s, 85-ton trucks were the largest used in West
Virginia mining. Back then, strip mines and valley fills were much smaller. Generally, fills
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MTR became the strip mining method of choice when new re-
strictions on sulfur emissions were added by amendments to the Clean
Air Act.121
The legislation resulted in heightened demand for the low-sulfur
coal found in the Central Appalachian coalfields.122 “The market for low-
sulfur coal, increased demand for electricity, and the development of
heavy machinery” allowed coal companies using MTR “to mine coal . . .
quicker, cheaper, and with fewer workers than underground mining.”123
Unlike conventional, smaller-scale strip mining, MTR methodology and
equipment allowed companies to extract multiple coal seams—some only
a few feet thick—that otherwise could not be profitably mined by earlier
mining methods.124
The federal SMCRA of 1977 defines mountaintop removal as “sur-
face mining activities, where the mining operation removes an entire coal
contained less than 250,000 cubic yards of rock and dirt. [By the end of the 1990s,] mountain-
top removal mines use[d] 240-ton trucks. Valley fills sometimes measure 100 million cubic
yards or more.”).
121 The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), reduced the competitiveness and demand for high-sulfur
coal. JOHN ALEXANDER WILLIAMS, APPALACHIA: A HISTORY 345 (2002). The amendments
provided electricity-generating utility companies a choice of means to reduce their emissions
of polluting sulfur dioxide. They could choose to install expensive equipment to “scrub”
their emissions, or replace high-sulfur with low-sulfur coal from central Appalachia or
low-sulfur and low-btu coal from strip mines in Montana and Wyoming. All. for Clean
Coal v. Bayh, 72 F.3d 556, 558 (7th Cir. 1995); How Coal Works, UNION OF CONCERNED SCI-
ENTISTS, https://www.ucsusa.org/clean-energy/all-about-coal/how-coal-works [https://perma
.cc/T6NJ-D3LK] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019).
122 See Peter T. Kilborn, East’s Coal Towns Wither in the Name of Cleaner Air, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 15, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/15/us/east-s-coal-towns-wither-in-the
-name-of-cleaner-air.html [https://perma.cc/7JHE-FDET]:
[In] Eastern coal country . . . the coal here is too high in sulfur to easily
meet the clean air requirements. Mines are thriving in the West and in
eastern Kentucky and southern West Virginia, all producers of low-
sulfur coal. But they are closing through most of Appalachia and in other
coal-mining areas east of the Mississippi . . . The mines in the high-sulfur
areas are shutting because when the coal they yield is burned, the sulfur
produces sulfur dioxide, a cause of acid rain. Under the Clean Air Act,
power plants were required to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions by half as
of January 1995, and they must cut them further by 2000. [Utilities] can
meet the air standards by blending high-sulfur coal with low-sulfur coal
from Wyoming and Montana or from eastern Kentucky and southern
West Virginia. Either way, the Clean Air Act has cut demand for high-
sulfur coal . . . .
123 Cho, supra note 117.
124 McGinley, supra note 30, at 57.
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seam or seams running through the upper fraction of a mountain, ridge,
or hill . . . by removing substantially all of the overburden off the bench
and creating a level plateau or a gently rolling contour, with no highwalls
remaining.”125
This sterile statutory language belied the reality of the new mining
methodology. A federal court summarized the MTR mining method:
The coalfields of southern West Virginia are mountainous,
with steep wooded slopes. Coal in these mountains is found
in seams of varying thickness sandwiched between layers of
rock and dirt. In mountaintop removal mining, the rock and
dirt overburden or “spoil” is removed, layer by layer, and the
coal is mined at the exposed surface, as it appears. The
ultimate effect is to remove the mountaintop to a depth
where deep mining is the practical method of recovery.126
After a helicopter overflight of all the then-existing MTR mines in south-
ern West Virginia, the court observed:
the extent and permanence of environmental degradation
this type of mining produces . . . . [T]he ground was cov-
ered with light snow, and mined sites were visible from
miles away. The sites stood out among the natural wooded
ridges as huge white plateaus, and the valley fills ap-
peared as massive, artificially landscaped stair steps. Some
mine sites were twenty years old, yet tree growth was
stunted or non-existent. Compared to the thick hardwoods
of surrounding undisturbed hills, the mine sites appeared
stark and barren and enormously different from the origi-
nal topography. . . . Destruction of the unique topography
of southern West Virginia . . . cannot be regarded as any-
thing but permanent and irreversible.127
125 30 U.S.C. § 1265(c) (2000); 30 C.F.R. § 785.14(b) (2004). MTR mining is authorized by
SMCRA as a variance from the general requirement that surface mines be returned to
their approximate original contour. 30 U.S.C. § 1265 (c)(2) (2018).
126 Bragg v. Robertson, 72 F. Supp. 2d 642, 646 (S.D.W. Va. 1999) (describing MTR and the
creation of valley fills), rev’d sub nom. Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass’n, 248 F.3d 275 (4th Cir.
2001); see also W. Va. Coal Ass’n v. Reilly, 728 F. Supp. 1276, 1281 (S.D.W. Va. 1989) (dis-
cussing the construction of valley fills), aff’d, CA-87-834-2, 1991 WL 75217 (4th Cir. 1991).
127 Bragg v. Robertson, 54 F. Supp. 2d 635, 646 (1999).
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Moreover, MTR mining runoff and drainage has a significant adverse
impact on downstream surface waters.128
While the level of destruction varies with the size of the mine, “[a]
large mine can deforest over 10 square miles and generate 750 million




Overburden from mountaintop removal is comprised of rocks,
rubble, and coal debris from the mined area.131 It is dumped in nearby
valleys using large earth-moving equipment and monster “rock trucks.”132
The area where the spoil is deposited is referred to as a “valley fill.”133
Typically, these MTR fills bury thousands of lineal feet of headwater
streams with waste hundreds of feet deep.134 The areas that formerly
were deep narrow valleys are filled to the adjacent ridge tops, whose sur-
faces are contoured and compressed by huge machines to create a rolling
surface configuration.135
128 See, e.g., ES Bernhardt et al., How Many Mountains Can We Mine? Assessing the Regional
Degradation of Central Appalachian Rivers by Surface Coal Mining, 46 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH.
8110, 8120 (2012), https://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/es301144q [https://perma.cc/AXV9
-FZAS] (“[S]urface coal mines degrade water quality and substantially alter stream biota
well downstream of their permit boundaries and that the extent and severity of these
impacts within river systems are proportional to the areal extent of surface coal mining”).
129 Cho, supra note 117.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 McGinley, supra note 30, at 86.
133 Id. at 55 n.177, 57.
134 Brian Lutz et al., The Environmental Price Tag on a Ton of Mountaintop Removal
Coal, 8 PLOS ONE e73203, e73203 (Sept. 2013), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles
/PMC3770658/pdf/pone.0073203.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7ER-L48K] (“The process of MTR
uses explosives and heavy machinery to remove entire mountain ridges in order to access
near surface coal deposits, producing vast quantities of mine spoil that fills valleys and
buries streams. MTR has expanded dramatically in recent decades and is now the dominant
driver of land-use change across the Central Appalachian region”).
135 30 C.F.R. § 785.14 (2018) (“Mountaintop removal mining means surface mining activi-
ties, where the mining operation removes an entire coal seam or seams running through
the upper fraction of a mountain, ridge or hill . . . by removing substantially all of the
overburden off the bench and creating a level plateau or gently rolling contour, with no
highwalls remaining.”).
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Valley fills are engineered and terraced in an effort to maintain
their stability.136 The fills are porous.137 They act like sponges over time,
slowly releasing water from the toe of the fill.138 Although the valley fills
are supposed to be reclaimed by establishing permanent native species
through vegetative cover, as required by federal and state reclamation
laws, in reality, revegetation leaves much to be desired.139
Water discharged from valley fills has been found to be contami-
nated by toxic minerals like selenium.140 A 2003 EPA report found that, “to
date[,] functioning headwater streams have not been re-created on mined
or filled areas as part of mine restoration or planned stream mitigation ef-
forts.”141 Over 2,000 miles of headwaters have been buried by valley fills,
and more than 500 mountaintop ridges in Appalachia, accounting for more
than one million acres of land, have been leveled by MTR operations.142
After overburden has been removed and the underlying coal ex-
cavated, it is loaded into trucks or placed on conveyor belts and “trans-
ported to processing sites, where it is washed, crushed, and separated
from noncombustible” rock and shale.143
The process produces enormous amounts of liquid waste,
called sludge or slurry, which is held in impoundments often
built onsite. These slurry ponds, usually hidden from public
view, can store billions of gallons of waste contaminated
with the carcinogenic chemicals used in coal processing and
toxic heavy metals found in coal such as arsenic, mercury,
chromium, cadmium, boron, selenium and nickel.144
136 McGinley, supra note 30, at 58 n.191.
137 See id. at 56 n.177 (describing valley fills being made up of dirt and rocks).
138 30 C.F.R. § 817.72(b)(1) (2017).
139 See Bragg, 54 F. Supp. at 635.
140 David Holzman, Mountaintop Removal Mining: Digging Into Community Health
Concerns, 119 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES A476, A478 (2011), https://www.ncbi.nlm
.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3226519/ [https://perma.cc/SSR8-3VRM] (investigating the
many ways MTR has polluted and damaged the ecology of Appalachia, and its continuing
negative impacts on public health).
141 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATE-
MENT ON MOUNTAINTOP MINING/VALLEY FILLS IN APPALACHIA—2003, III.D-20 (2003), https://
nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P100G0BS.PDF?Dockey=P100G0BS.PDF [https://perma
.cc/H2Q7-YM58].
142 Ecological Impacts of Mountaintop Removal, APPALACHIAN VOICES, http://appvoices.org
/end-mountaintop-removal/ecology/ [https://perma.cc/UA4Q-49JP] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019).
143 Loretta Cain & Michael Hendryx, Learning Outcomes Among Students in Relation to West
Virginia Coal Mining: An Environmental Riskscape Approach, 3 ENVTL. JUST. 71, 72 (2010).
144 Cho, supra note 117.
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MTR sites, and associated processing facilities and slurry ponds, are
concentrated in Central Appalachia.145 An estimated 1.2 million acres of
Central Appalachia had been impacted by MTR operations as of 2009, a
number which has undoubtedly continued to rise in the past decade.146
2. Air and Water Pollution, and Coal Waste
While Central Appalachian mining towns were once inhabited by
tens of thousands of miners and their families, these numbers have
dwindled as decades of coal mine mechanization decimated the work-
force.147 These coalfield communities are characterized by high rates of
poverty, unemployment, sparse educational and occupational opportunities,
and low educational attainments.148 While mortality rates across the rest
of the country are improving and life expectancies are on the rise, the op-
posite is true in Central Appalachian coalfield communities.149 Not surpris-
ingly, access to basic healthcare is problematic in the region where some
of the most severe health disparities in the United States occur.150
A comprehensive 2017 Appalachian Regional Commission (“ARC”)
report confirmed that “Appalachian incomes, poverty rates, unemploy-
ment rates, and postsecondary education levels [are] still lagging behind
145 See id.
146 Mountaintop Removal 101, APPALACHIAN VOICES, http://appvoices.org/end-mountaintop-re
moval/mtr101/ [https://perma.cc/UPE7-EAHE] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019).
147 Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/WV [https://
perma.cc/QQU7-RVYW] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019).
148 See generally JULIE L. MARSHALL ET AL., APPALACHIA REG. COMM’N, HEALTH DISPARITIES
IN APPALACHIA (Aug. 2017), https://www.arc.gov/research/researchreportdetails.asp?RE
PORT_ID=138 [https://perma.cc/YCX4-K63W] [hereinafter HEALTH DISPARITIES]. See,
e.g., W. VA. RURAL HEALTH ASSOC., HEALTH CARE IN WEST VIRGINIA 15–16 (Aug. 2017),
https://wvrha.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/2017-FINAL-WV-Workforce-8312017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LN5P-87PH].
149 Id. at 5–6. See Michael Hendryx, Poverty and Mortality Disparities in Central Appalachia:
Mountaintop Mining and Environmental Justice, 4 J. HEALTH DISPARITIES RES. & PRAC.
44, 48–50 (Spring 2011); David Squires & David Blumental, Mortality Trends Among Work-
ing-Age Whites: The Untold Stories, COMMONWEALTH FUND, https://www.commonwealth
fund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2016/jan/mortality-trends-among-working-age-whites
-untold-story [https://perma.cc/9XRM-H64J] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019).
150 HEALTH DISPARITIES, supra note 148, at 6. Leigh-Anne Krometis et al., Environmental
Health Disparities in the Central Appalachian Region of the United States, 32 REV. ENVTL.
HEALTH 253 (2017) (“the National Institute on Minority Health and Health Disparities has
recognized Appalachia as an area exhibiting persistent disparities that require further
research.”). See also W. VA. RURAL HEALTH ASSOC., supra note 148, at 98–105 (a 2015 re-
port examining healthcare in West Virginia found that significant needs are unmet).
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performance at the national level.”151 Moreover, the ARC study reported
that the region “performs poorly when compared to the nation as a whole”
with regard to many reviewed health drivers and outcomes.152 Importantly,
the ARC report emphasized that “[p]rogress in the socioeconomic and
health spheres are often interrelated, if not interdependent, and much
work remains.”153
Hopefully the forgoing summary discussion of the history of coal
mining in Appalachia and the evolution of mining methods will inform
the following discussion.
II. BLACK LUNG DISEASE
A. Coal Workers’ Pneumoconiosis: Black Lung Disease
As is the case with other major coal externalities, the public is
almost completely unaware of an insidious health hazard known as
“black lung.”154 In earlier years the malady was called “miners’ asthma”
and “anthracosis.”155 Now, black lung is the commonly used term for a
151 HEALTH DISPARITIES, supra note 148, at 3. The report, however, observes that over the
last fifty years, Appalachia has made significant progress. Its poverty rate dropped from
31% in 1960 to 17.2% from 2010–2014. Moreover, high-poverty counties in the region (those
with poverty rates more than 1.5 times the national average) fell from 295 in 1960 to
ninety-one over the same period). Id.
152 Id. The report explains that “health drivers” are often referred to as “health determi-
nants.” They are “measures that impact health status and can be socioeconomic, behavioral,
environmental, or associated with the quality of the health care system.” The ARC report
correlates income and educational attainment with overall health status. “Some drivers,”
like the availability of mental health providers, might impact outcomes regarding be-
havioral health. Id. at 21.
153 Id.
154 See Krometis et al., supra note 150, at 254.
155 Pathologists who observed that lungs of diseased miners appeared black instead of the
natural pink color of healthy lung tissue coined the non-scientific descriptive term “black
lung.” See Black Lung Disease, WEBMD (May 4, 2010), https://www.webmd.com/lung
/black-lung-disease#1 [https://perma.cc/T738-K6WY]. Over time, inhalation of coal dust
results in the accumulation of the foreign material in the lungs. See id. Miners’ risk of
developing emphysema and chronic bronchitis increases as the dust accumulates in the
organs. See id. Black lung presents in two forms: simple, which is known as coal workers’
pneumoconiosis (“CWP”), and complicated, referred to as progressive massive fibrosis
(“PMF”). Id. Miners’ risk of incurring chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”)
also increases with inhalation of coal dust. Id.
716 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 43:689
lung disease whose medical name is “coal workers’ pneumoconiosis.”156
Miners develop the disease as a result of their inhalation of coal dust
while working in coal mines.157 Symptoms of the disease include “pro-
gressive dyspnea, chest discomfort, and cough, sometimes dramatically
accompanied by the expectoration of copious quantities of black, inky
sputum.”158 The malady can be debilitating and is often fatal.159 West
Virginia University doctor Edward Petsonk, a nationally recognized occu-
pational health expert, described the horror of the disease:
Black lung leaves miners’ lungs scarred, shriveled and
black. They struggle to do routine tasks and are eventu-
ally forced to choose between eating and breathing. “No
human being should have to go through the misery that
dying of [black lung] entails,” said Dr. Edward Petsonk, who
treats patients with black lung and works with NIOSH. “It
is like a screw being slowly tightened across your throat.
It is really almost a diabolical torture.”160
B. Nineteenth-Century Medicine Recognized Coal Dust As a
Debilitating Cause of Lung Disease
Doctors treating miners in Great Britain first identified black
lung disease in the mid-nineteenth century.161 By the latter half of the
century, persuasive medical literature linked coal mine dust with work-
ers’ lung disease.162 European science shaped the North American under-
standing of miners’ respiratory distress.163 Tying unmistakable readily
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Greg Wagner, Black Lung: Anatomy of a Public Health Disaster, 340 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1770 (1999) (book review).
159 Id.
160 Chris Hamby, Black Lung Surges Back in Coal Country, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY
(May 19, 2014), https://publicintegrity.org/workers-rights/black-lung-surges-back-in-coal
-country/ [https://perma.cc/2Q 9L-3R8X]. See DERICKSON, supra note 16, at 6. See also
BARBARA ELLEN SMITH, DIGGING OUR OWN GRAVES: COAL MINERS AND THE STRUGGLE
OVER BLACK LUNG DISEASE 4 (1987).
161 See DERICKSON, supra note 16, at 6. However, it was not until 1937 that the disease
was recognized in the United Kingdom as a compensable occupational medical condition.
See SMITH, supra note 160.
162 See DERICKSON, supra note 16, at 6.
163 Id. at 4.
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perceived signs and symptoms to anatomical discoveries offered strong
substantiation of the existence of miners’ pneumoconiosis.164
By 1900, there was compelling scientific evidence that many coal
miners suffered from a debilitating occupational disease, commonly known
in biomedical parlance as anthracosis and popularly referred to as “miners’
asthma.”165 The United Mine Workers Union (“UMWA”) took the lead in
trying to educate the public about the causes and symptoms of black lung
disease.166 During a 1902 strike in the anthracite coalfields of Pennsylva-
nia, the UMWA championed the cause of aging miners who, for very low
wages, toiled in dangerous and dusty conditions—just to provide for the
minimal basic needs of their families.167
Even coal company managers grudgingly conceded the existence
of miners’ asthma.168 Coal operators retrenched, insisting that “not very
many men crawled to work.”169 Thus, at that time, it was well-established
that coal dust caused miners’ respiratory disease.170 However, that con-
clusion was soon to be obscured by the coal industry and its doctors.171 It
was even broadly denied by the medical profession.172
C. Refuting Science and Common Sense: Industry Denial of
Causal Connection Between Coal Dust and Miner Respiratory
Diseases: 1900–1935
At the turn of the century, notwithstanding the fact that black
lung was a reasonably well-understood major form of occupational
disease, coal companies began to deny and discredit the obvious—that
164 Id.
165 Id. at 1–2 (In the U.S., “well before the turn of the 20th Century,” clinical and pathological
investigations supported the conclusion that inhaled coal dust caused miners’ lung ailments).
166 Richard Fry, Making Amends: Coal Miner, the Black Lung Association, and Federal
Compensation Reform, 1969–1972, FED. HIST. 2013 35–37, http://www.shfg.org/resources
/Documents/FH%205%20(2013)%20Fry.pdf [https://perma.cc/FGQ3-U86N].
167 DERICKSON, supra note 16, at 41. The small pay increase negotiated to end the strike,
however, did not allow miners to keep their sons in school. The number of children em-
ployed in coal mines in the years following the work stoppage continued to grow. The
National Child Labor Committee estimated that in 1906, approximately 10,000 boys under
the age of fourteen worked in the anthracite coal region. Id. at 41–42.
168 Id. at 14–15.
169 Id. at 41.
170 See id.
171 Id. at 16–17.
172 Id. at 20.
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the blackened lungs of diseased coal miners were caused by inhalation
of coal dust.173 Creating an alternative reality fantasy, coal operators pro-
moted the healthful nature of extractive work, with the intention of
refuting the claims of the miners’ union.174 Coal companies trumpeted the
alleged longevity of the coal workforce while dismissing black lung as an
inconsequential discoloration of the lungs.175 “There are no healthier men
anywhere, than in the mining industry,” they claimed.176
Some coal industry officials, politicians, and many medical doctors
claimed inhalation of coal dust posed no health threat.177 Doctors influenced
or employed by coal companies claimed that inhalation of fine coal parti-
cles “posed no hazard at all” to miners.178 A Pennsylvania doctor working
for the coal industry maintained that coal mine environments were inhos-
pitable to infection.179 Coal mines, some claimed, were much preferable to
sweatshops and other disease-ridden workplaces.180 Many in the medical
profession embraced such opinions.181 “One doctor speculated that the
mechanical action of inhaled coal particles in the lung conferred invulnera-
bility to infection.”182 Fallacious arguments supported the false narratives:
company physicians [asserted] that inhaling coal mine dust
was harmless because the body was naturally equipped to
expectorate “deposits of carbon” and thus purify itself.
Another claim was that inhaling carbonaceous dusts was
in fact beneficial to miners’ health because it caused fibrotic
formations which supposedly prevented tubercular bacilli
“from getting a foothold” in the lungs. A third industry po-
sition was that the only real danger posed by either an-
thracite or bituminous mining was inhalation of “silicious
dusts associated with sandstone, slate, and other minerals
that occurred with coal deposits.”183
173 DERICKSON, supra note 16, at 10.
174 Id. at 58.
175 Id. at 44.
176 Id. at 53.
177 Id. at 49.
178 Id. at 43.




183 Brian C. Murchison, Due Process, Black Lung, and the Shaping of Administrative Jus-
tice, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1025, 1040–41 (2002) [hereinafter Shaping Administrative Justice]
(emphasis in original).
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Remarkably, the companies’ efforts to link all mining-related dust dis-
ease with silicosis evolved into conventional wisdom—“the only conceded
effect of inhaling coal particles without significant silica was anthracosis,
which coal interests insisted was not a disease but a discoloration of the
lung.”184 Disturbingly, coal industry officials deflected attention by claiming
silica inhalation, not coal dust, was the cause of miners’ lung disorders.185
Moreover, government scientists with expertise did nothing to resist the
absolution of coal mine dust during the first three decades of the century;
instead, public health officials “helped white-wash black lung.”186 Over
the period from 1900–1930, black lung “virtually disappeared from the
view of those outside the working class.”187
Of course, coal miners and many doctors and mining engineers
were not deceived.188 For those who had worked underground, treated
miners gasping for breath, or participated in a post-mortem, the dis-
avowal of a causal connection between miners’ inhalation of coal dust and
lung disease perpetrated a cynical sham.189 Daniel Harrington, an experi-
enced engineer employed by the U.S. Bureau of Mines in the 1920s,
provided one of the few voices calling public attention to the malevolent
ruse.190 Harrington condemned the “sheep-like acceptance of half-baked
statements and misinterpreted statistics . . . [t]hat . . . [had fostered] a
positive belief the coal mining is one of the most healthful occupations.”191
D. The Coal Industry’s Black Lung Reductionist Paradigm
Survives: 1935–1969
Professor Alan Derickson, the author of the definitive history of
black lung disease, has observed that “biomedical rethinking and indus-
trial public relations effectively combined to marginalize miners’ griev-
ances regarding their lung ailments.”192 However, in 1935, the New Deal
184 Id.
185 Id. at 1040–41.
186 DERICKSON, supra note 16, at 60 (citing Emery R. Hayhurst, Health Hazards of Nonpoi-
sonous Costs: A Resume of Some Recent Investigations, 10 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 60, 62 (1920)).
187 DERICKSON, supra note 16, at 58.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 4, 36.
190 Id. at 77.
191 Id. at 78.
192 Id. at 59.
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Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).193 The
NLRA established federally protected rights of employees and employers,
encouraged collective bargaining, and sought to curb harmful private-
sector labor and management practices that disadvantaged workers, and
adversely impacted businesses and the U.S. economy.194
The NLRA, and other laws passed during the New Deal administra-
tion of President Franklin Roosevelt in response to the Great Depression
and worldwide economic crisis, radically altered the balance of political
and economic power in the nation.195 A new era of government regulation
of business and industry saw the UMWA acquire new influence in public
policymaking; by the late 1930s, after almost four decades of coal indus-
try denial, black lung disease reemerged as an important public issue.196
In addition to pressing for legislation imposing a federal system of mine
safety regulation, the UMWA renewed its campaign advocating for a fed-
eral program to provide financial support for disabled mine workers and
a pension for widows of miners succumbing to black lung disease.197
Not surprisingly, coal companies and their insurers sought to avoid
underwriting the risk to which coal miners would be exposed on the job,
and consequently afflicted with black lung disease.198 “In this perverse view,
victims of the disabling disorder deserve no compensation not because their
disease was so rare as to fall below the threshold of public concern but
rather because it was so commonplace.”199
In spite of industry and insurer resistance, legislation was eventu-
ally enacted in 1937 by the Pennsylvania legislature that, on its face,
seemed to require compensation for anthracite coal miners suffering from
lung disease.200 However, coal companies dodged the bullet of financial
193 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2018).
194 Introduction to the NLRB, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb-introduction [https://perma
.cc/QS63-JUHD] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019).
195 See generally ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER JR., THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL: 1935–1936, THE
AGE OF ROOSEVELT, VOLUME III (2003).
196 Id.
197 DERICKSON, supra note 16, at 87. A coal miner, commenting on the dilemma in the
UMWA union’s journal, observed that “sick men clung to their jobs because ‘their options
were to dig coal or the poorhouse.’ ” Id. He asserted that they worked as long as they
could in the mines, though suffering from lung disease, because their low wages did not
permit them to save for retirement. Id. Responding to the industry claim that coal mining
was a healthy occupation, Joseph Pico remarked that if someone took a mining job to cure
his lung disease he would “soon be where he doesn’t need any cure.” Id. at 57.
198 Id. at 91.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 67.
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responsibility by persuading legislators to pin the cost on state taxpayers.201
Pennsylvania’s mine owners were not satisfied.202 Almost all coal compa-
nies refused to participate in the compensation program.203 In 1941, a state
union leader observed, “we now have on the statute books of Pennsylvania
an occupational disease law that means actually nothing to the anthra-
cite miner.”204
Professor Derickson has observed that “[t]he [black lung] reduc-
tionist paradigm emerged from the turmoil of the depression very much
intact.”205 The paradigm lasted for two more decades before it was jetti-
soned when “confrontational collective action accomplished what careful
scientific investigation and subtle private negotiation could not.”206
E. Federal Regulation of Respirable Coal Dust
Ultimately, government-based respirable dust regulation and com-
pensation was not triggered by the overwhelming medical and scientific
evidence of the devastating effect of coal dust.207 Instead, a grassroots
movement that gathered steam over a decade was propelled forward by
a tragic mine disaster that killed seventy-eight men in November of 1968
at Farmington, West Virginia.208 In the winter of 1969, thousands of
miners and black lung widows marched on the West Virginia Capitol,
successfully demanding state legislation to compensate miners afflicted
with black lung.209 Later that year, and under growing pressure by the
201 Id. at 101.
202 Id.
203 DERICKSON, supra note 16, at 103.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 110–11 (“If anything, it became more secure by adapting in response to political
challenges [. . . .] Just as they enjoyed no Progressive Era with regard to occupational
disease reform, breathless coal miners had no New Deal [. . . .] [weak federal policy] also re-
flected the historical accumulation and dissemination of a body of official misinformation.”).
206 Id. at xii (“mystifying scientific jargon lifted to reveal masses of breathless, displaced
old men, destroyed by their work.”).
207 Id. at 20.
208 In November 1968, the Farmington Mine exploded in West Virginia, killing seventy-
eight miners. The Farmington disaster “intensified national concern about occupational
hazards and provided the black lung protesters with a direct opportunity to influence
policy debates within the West Virginia Legislature and the U.S. Congress.” ROBERT
GOTTLIEB, FORCING THE SPRING: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL
MOVEMENT 358–59 [hereinafter FORCING THE SPRING].
209 See id. See also Shaping Administrative Justice, supra note 183, at 1026–27 (“it is the
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grassroots movement and media attention, Congress enacted the federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (“1969 Act”).210 That law re-
quired coal operators to reduce miner exposure to respirable coal dust,
and mandated compensation for disabled black lung victims, miners’
widows, and their families.211
Finally, after decades of dispute and denial, Congress recognized
that miners’ respiration of coal dust is the cause of black lung disease.212
The 1969 Act created a regulatory agency to administer and enforce the
law’s protective safety and health requirements.213 It required coal com-
panies to limit miners’ exposure to coal dust in their underground work-
place.214 The goal of the statute was to:
provide, to the greatest extent possible, that working condi-
tions in each underground coal mine are sufficiently free
of respirable dust to permit each miner the opportunity to
work underground during the period of his entire life with-
out incurring any disability from pneumoconiosis or any
other occupation-related disease during or at the end of
such period.215
This Congressional goal reflects a deeply disturbing truth—black lung
disease is, and has been, entirely preventable over the course of many
decades with application of basic protective measures.216 Since 1969, the
federal government has administered a compensation program for vic-
tims of black lung, paid in part by coal company fees.217 From 1969
story of workers who moved from passive frustration about occupational disease to
militancy about legislative solutions . . . miners in the late 1960s used the pressure of
strikes to force state and federal officials to recognize what miners had long known: that
[coal dust] can grievously impair breathing function and even cause premature death”).
210 See Shaping Administrative Justice, supra note 183, at 1043–47 (detailed review of
events leading up to the enactment of the 1969 Act).
211 FORCING THE SPRING, supra note 208, at 359. See 30 U.S.C. § 842 (2018) (“Dust concen-
tration and respiratory equipment”); 30 U.S.C. §§ 901–945 (2018) (Black Lung Benefits Act).
212 DERICKSON, supra note 16, at 169–75.
213 Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-173, title II, § 202, Dec. 30,
1969; amended by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-164 (1977).
214 See Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 842(b)(2) (2018); Black
Lung Benefits Act, 83 Stat. 792 (2018).
215 30 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2018).
216 D.J. Blackley et al., Continued Increase in Prevalence of Coal Workers’ Pneumoconiosis
in the United States, 1970–2017, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH e1–e3 (Sept. 2018).
217 See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 8–12 (1976) (highlighting the origins
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through 2004, black lung benefits paid to almost one million miners
totaled more than $41 billion.218 As discussed below, over time, the dust
mitigation measures required by the 1969 Act significantly reduced, but
did not eliminate, the scourge of black lung among the nation’s coal
miners.219
F. Resurgence of Black Lung & Related Lung Diseases & Industry
Resistance
By 2004, thirty-five years after the 1969 Act was passed, another
123,000 miners were estimated to have died as a result of inhalation of
coal dust.220 While the incidence of black lung disease declined substan-
tially for a time, the prevalence of the disease has been increasing for more
than a decade and a half.221 Although the law was intended to minimize
miner exposure to coal dust in the workplace, and consequently black
lung disease, modern coal mining technologies have increased exposure
of the black lung program and the system it creates). See generally Donald T. DeCarlo,
The Federal Black Lung Experience, 26 HOW. L.J. 1335 (1983).
218 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 08-628T, FEDERAL COMPENSATION PROGRAMS:
PERSPECTIVE ON FOUR PROGRAMS FOR INDIVIDUALS INJURED BY EXPOSURE TO HARMFUL
SUBSTANCES, BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
111th Cong. (2008), at 2 (Statement of Anne-Marie Lofaso, Acting Director Education,
Workforce, and Income Security Issues), https://www.gao.gov/assets/120/119462.pdf [https://
perma.cc/F9V7-JFBR]. One black lung program expert noted that mine “owners have
managed to cap and partially off-load their liability for black lung disease on both the
companies that buy coal and the American people.” DERICKSON, supra note 16, at 6.
219 M.D. Attfield et al., Changing Patterns of Pneumoconiosis Mortality—United States,
1968–2000, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL (July 23, 2004), https://www.cdc.gov/MMWR/pre
view/mmwrhtml/mm5328a1.htm [https://perma.cc/EU4B-42DS].
220 See CHRISTOPHER W. SHAW, UNDERMINING SAFETY: A REPORT ON COAL MINE SAFETY 7–8
(2008), https://www.csrl.org/UnderminingSafety/UnderminingSafety.pdf [https://perma
.cc/2K2K-AX36]; see also Brenda Wilson, The Quiet Deaths Outside the Coal Mines, NPR
(Apr. 16, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126021059 [https://
perma.cc/K8FQ-KEYD].
221 Gardiner Harris & Ralph Dunlop, Dust, Deception and Death: Why Black Lung Has
Not Been Wiped Out, LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL, Apr. 19, 1998, at A1, https://www.de
mocracynow.org/1999/4/14/dust_deception_and_death [https://perma.cc/3ZUA-EXXS]
(“Every year, black lung disease kills almost 1,500 people who have worked in the nation’s
coal mines. It’s as if the Titanic sank every year, and no ships came to the rescue. While
that long-ago disaster continues to fascinate the nation, the miners slip into cold, early
graves almost unnoticed.”). NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., ENG’G, & MED., MONITORING AND SAMPLING
APPROACHES TO ASSESS UNDERGROUND COAL MINE DUST EXPOSURES 15–16 (2018).
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of miners to black lung disease.222 Both young and experienced miners
are being diagnosed with the disease.223
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(“NIOSH”) first confirmed this trend in 1995 and emphasized that respira-
ble dust standards had to be strengthened.224 Notwithstanding NIOSH’s
findings, and the urgency they suggested, the Mine Safety and Health Ad-
ministration (“MSHA”) did not move to tighten respirable coal dust stan-
dards until 2010.225 In that year, the agency finally proposed a rule aimed
at lowering miners’ exposure to coal dust.226
222 See Howard Berkes, Republican Lawmakers Seek To Block Funding On Black Lung Regu-
lation, NPR (July 17, 2012), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2012/07/17/156908140
/republican-lawmakers-seek-to-block-funding-on-black-lung-regulation [https://perma
.cc/498K-2K7Y] (“[D]ata from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) also shows that diagnoses of the worst stages of the disease have quadrupled
since the 1980’s in eastern Kentucky, southwestern Virginia and southern West Virginia.”).
223 One indication that coal companies were ignoring the danger of exposing their workers
to dangerous levels of coal dust surfaced with MSHA’s 2006 report that, over a five-year
period, U.S. coal mines had been cited for more than 6,000 violations of airborne coal dust
rules each year. Ken Ward Jr., Beyond Sago; Coal Mine Safety in America: Coal Dust Most
Common Violation; Mines Averaging 6,000 Citations for it Each Year, CHARLESTON GAZETTE-
MAIL, Dec. 17, 2006, at 1B.
224 NAT’L INST. OCCUP. SAFETY & HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., NIOSH
PUB. NO. 95-106, CRITERIA FOR A RECOMMENDED STANDARD: OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE TO
RESPIRABLE COAL MINE DUST iii (1995), https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/95-106/default
.html [https://perma.cc/JP22-ACPJ]. The NIOSH report warned that the “recommended
exposure limit . . . does not insure that miners exposed at this concentration over a
lifetime will have a zero risk of developing occupational respiratory diseases.” NIOSH
recommended additional protective measures including limiting worker exposure through
“engineering controls and work practices” and “frequent monitoring of worker exposures,
and . . . participation of miners in . . . medical screening and surveillance program.” Id.
225 See Kevin Ward, Jr., Obama MSHA Proposes Phase-in of Tighter Standards on Coal Dust
That Causes Deadly Black Lung Disease, CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL: COAL TATTOO (Oct. 14,
2010), http://blogs.wvgazettemail.com/coaltattoo/2010/10/14/obama-msha-proposes-phase-in
-of-tighter-standard-on-coal-dust-that-causes-deadly-black-lung-disease/ [https://perma.cc
/56MP-NNXW] (The rule addressed many previously identified problems with existing fed-
eral mining regulations, such as updating methods to measure coal dust to have information
collected better reflect working conditions. If implemented, the proposed rule would have re-
quired miners working in high dust-concentration areas to wear personal dust monitors).
226 Lowering Miners’ Exposure to Respirable Coal Mine Dust, Including Continuous Per-
sonal Dust Monitors, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,412 (proposed Oct. 19, 2010) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R.
pts. 70, 71, 72, 75, 90). Referring to the 1969 Act, one commentator put MSHA’s inability to
act on NIOSH’s 1995 recommendations in a larger context:
For 15 years, the scientific evidence has been telling us that US coal
miners are exposed to levels of respirable dust that cause disease, but
under the current federal mine safety regulations, these exposure levels
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The coal industry, however, almost uniformly objected to the pro-
posed rule on a number of grounds, which included the assertion that the
rule would not reduce the incidence of black lung.227 A coal company
executive attacked the proposal using familiar industry hyperbole:
It’s absolutely a job killer, and it’s killing jobs across Ohio
and Appalachia . . . MSHA has proposed a Respirable Dust
Standard that is unachievable in underground mine set-
tings, and continues to be unable to produce the relevant
data that they claim creates the causation basis for their
rule. Day to day, our company sees the impacts of how
MSHA is being used as a tool to stop coal mining.228
As coal industry executives and lobbyists were gearing up to resist
the proposed rule, investigators reported that autopsies of the miners
killed by the 2010 explosion at the Upper Big Branch (“UBB”) mine found
are legal. That needs to change. Not only is it ethically the right thing
to do, but it is also the law of the land.
Celeste Montforton, No Matter What Mining Industry Reps Say, MSHA’s Proposed Rule
to Address Black Lung is Easily Achievable, THE PUMP HANDLE (July 19, 2011), http://
www.thepumphandle.org/2011/07/19/no-matter-what-mining-industry/ [https://perma.cc
/DC9Q-K4U4].
227 See Industry submission to docket MSHA-2010-0007, Lowering Miners’ Exposure to
Respirable Coal Mine Dust, Including Continuous Personal Dust Monitors, OFFICE OF THE
FED. REG, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2010/10/19/2010-25249/lowering-min
ers-exposure-to-respirable-coal-mine-dust-including-continuous-personal-dust-monitors
[https://perma.cc/7AFY-R6P6] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019) (public comments involved in the
proposed rule Lowering Miners’ Exposure to Respirable Coal Mine Dust Including Contin-
uous Personal Dust Monitors (Fed. Reg. Doc. 2010-25249)). See also, e.g., Testimony of George
Ellis, President, Pennsylvania Coal Association, MINE SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN. 9 (Feb. 8,
2011), http://files.dep.state.pa.us/publicparticipation/citizens %20advisory%20council/cac
portalfiles/meetings/2011_04/testimonyact54april19,2011compatibleversion.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2JTE-6JCN] (“What evidence does MSHA have to show that the . . . standard
that has been used to protect Part 90 miners for the past 40 years is no longer adequate?
This appears to be a case of arbitrarily cutting the standard in half, since the proposed
standard will be reduced by that amount? The rule also appears to include a variety of 30
C.F.R. Part 75 changes that bear no rational relationship whatsoever to preventing CWP.”).
228 EPA’s Appalachian Energy Prematorium: Job Killer or Creator? Hearing before the Sub-
comm. on Reg. Affairs, Stimulus Oversight & Gov’t Spending of the H. Comm. on Oversight
& Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. (July 14, 2011) (statement of Tom Mackall, President, Sterling
Mining Corp.), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg73445/html/CHRG
-112hhrg73445.htm [https://perma.cc/597H-PNEX]. But see Montforton, supra note 226
(“Respirable dust concentrations at Mr. Mackall’s underground coal mines are comparable
to the situation nationwide. MSHA’s enforcement data indicates that the vast majority of
coal mine operators are already complying with the 1.0 milligram standard.”).
726 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 43:689
almost three-quarters of them had black lung disease.229 This percentage
was more than twenty times higher than what MSHA and the industry
had claimed to be the average for all underground coal miners.230 The
autopsies revealed that both old and young UBB miners had acquired the
disease—a few were as young as twenty-five.231 Five had been working
in coal mines for fewer than ten years.232 The West Virginia Governor’s
Independent Investigation Panel on the UBB explosion asserted that “the
victims at UBB constitute a random sample of miners . . . the fact that
71 percent of them show evidence of CWP is an alarming finding given
the ages and work history of these men.”233
Over the objections of coal companies and their lobbyists, MSHA
promulgated a final rule six years into the Obama administration.234 Not-
withstanding the coal industry’s complaints of over-regulation, convincing,
robust evidence shows that coal miners, in increasing numbers, continue
to be exposed to crippling levels of respirable dust in American mines.235
229 GOVERNOR’S INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL, UPPER BIG BRANCH: REPORT TO THE
GOVERNOR 32 (May 2011), https://media.npr.org/documents/2011/may/giip-massey-re
port.pdf [https://perma.cc/SJ2S-X9ZE]. See also Hamby, supra note 160.
230 See id.
231 GOVERNOR’S INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL, supra note 229, at 32.
232 Id. at n.260.
233 Id. at 32. Dr. Edward Petsonk, a nationally recognized black lung expert, indicates
that in 2003, researchers identified an increase in the incidence of the disease and since
then documented the doubling of cases. See Most Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster
Victims Had Black Lung Disease, HAZARDEX (July 9, 2012), http://www.hazardexonthe
net.net/article/51666/Most-Upper-Big-Branch-mine-disastervictims-had-black-lung-dis
ease.aspx?AreaID=2 [https://perma.cc/MA6N-4SND]. Of great concern is the frequency
of the most severe type—progressive massive fibrosis, which is incapacitating and fatal.
Id. “Researchers have identified hot spots of new cases, many in a triangular region of
Appalachia stretching from eastern Kentucky through southern West Virginia and into
southwestern Virginia.” Id.
234 Lowering Miners’ Exposure to Respirable Coal Mine Dust, Including Continuous
Personal Dust Monitors, 79 Fed. Reg. 24,813 (May 1, 2014). See Nat’l Min. Ass’n v. Sec.,
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 812 F.3d 843 (11th Cir. 2016) (upholding regulation over coal
industry objections).
235 A very recent report of the National Academies of Sciences emphasized that:
. . . since around the year 2000, an increase in prevalence and severity
of CWP has been observed in various hot-spot geographic regions. The
reasons for this increase are not obvious but could be related to changes
in mining practices and conditions (for instance, increase in equipment
size and horsepower and mining increasingly thinner coal seams)
leading to increased extraction of rock containing crystal silica and
other [respirable coal mining dust] components.
NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., ENG’G & MED., supra note 221. See, e.g., Howard Berkes, As Mine
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A recent in-depth report by National Public Radio and the Center
for Public Integrity explored the failure of government regulators to
enforce the 1969 Act, as well as the coal industry’s resistance to, and
worse, its intentional cheating to avoid, compliance with mine dust
regulatory standards:
A multiyear investigation by NPR and the PBS program
Frontline found that Smith and Kelly are part of a tragic
and recently discovered outbreak of the advanced stage of
black lung disease . . . . A federal monitoring program
reported just 99 cases of advanced black lung disease
nationwide from 2011–2016. But NPR identified more than
2,000 coal miners suffering from the disease in the same
time frame, and in just five Appalachian states . . . analysis
of federal regulatory data—decades of information recorded
by dust-collection monitors placed where coal miners work—
has revealed a tragic failure to recognize and respond to
clear signs of danger. For decades, government regulators
had evidence of excessive and toxic mine dust exposures,
the kind that can cause PMF, as they were happening.
They knew that miners like Kelly and Smith were likely
to become sick and die. They were urged to take specific
and direct action to stop it. But they didn’t.236
Protections Fail, Black Lung Cases Surge, NPR (July 9, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/07/09
/155978300/as-mine-protections-fail-black-lung-cases-surge [https://perma.cc/W3L6-237W]
(“Incidence of the disease has doubled in the last decade, according to data analyzed by
[an] epidemiologist . . . at the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health.”).
236 Howard Berkes, Huo Jingnan, & Robert Benincasa, An Epidemic Is Killing Thousands
Of Coal Miners. Regulators Could Have Stopped It, NPR (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.npr
.org/2018/12/18/675253856/an-epidemic-is-killing-thousands-of-coal-miners-regulators
-could-have-stopped-it/ [https://perma.cc/4YPQ-6Q8T]. The NPR assertion that coal com-
pany managers engaged in “intentional cheating to avoid compliance with mine dust
regulatory standards” is underscored by the fact that in the winter of 2019 the Department
of Justice charged “the manager of all of Armstrong Coal’s western Kentucky mines, a
superintendent, safety director and section foreman at Armstrong’s Parkway Mine and
a safety director at the company’s Kronos mine” with “fabricating dust tests, placing dust
monitors in clean rooms instead of actual workplaces, and submitting results from days
when the mine was not operating.” Becca Schimmel, Federal Prosecutor Adds Charges
In Kentucky Coal Dust Fraud Case, OHIO VALLEY RESOURCE (Feb. 27, 2019), https://ohio
valleyresource.org/2019/02/27/federal-prosecutor-adds-charges-in-kentucky-coal-dust
-fraud-case/ [https://perma.cc/JY34-HBEE] (The United States Attorney overseeing the
prosecutions stated “Our goal is to go up the chain to those that made decisions, very
clear business decisions that exposed miners to a grave degree of risk.”).
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Scott Laney, an epidemiologist at the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health said that black lung is an “epidemic” and “clearly one
of the worst industrial medicine disasters that’s ever been described [. . .]
[w]e’re counting thousands of cases,” he said.237 “Thousands and thou-
sands and thousands of black lung cases. Thousands of cases of the most
severe form of black lung. And we’re not done counting yet.”238
NPR and Frontline asked Bruce Watzman, the National Mining
Association’s top lobbyist for the last thirty years, why mining companies
did not act on their own to protect their workers:
Sure they could have done that . . . . But . . . I’m not going to
speculate on why they did or didn’t do what they chose . . . .
Our focus here is forward looking . . . . How do we prevent
this in the future? I can’t answer for . . . what happened in
the past . . . . [The industry] is doing far better today than
we did in the past, far better.239
Notwithstanding the sordid history reviewed above at a time when hid-
den truths are beginning to emerge about the resurgence of black lung
disease in Central Appalachia and its horrendous impacts on coal min-
ers, their families, and coalfield communities, the Trump administration
has announced that it is reconsidering the 2014 black lung rule issued
by former President Obama’s regulators.240
True to its history of resistance to black lung regulation, the coal
industry supports this action.241 In a press release, the National Mining
Association spokesman, Luke Popovich, stated that the Association’s mem-
bers “believe a review of the dust-exposure rule ‘might shed valuable
information on . . . ways it might be improved to provide further protection
for miners while eliminating unnecessary implementation requirements
for operators.’ ”242
As discussed below, at the same time miners are suffering and dying
while black lung disease surges in Central Appalachia, the coal industry
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Berkes, Jingnan, & Benincasa, supra note 236 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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and the Trump administration dispute and belittle a decade of epidemio-
logical research that has found significant correlations between the envi-
ronmental externalities of coal mining in the region and poor public health
outcomes.243 The history of the struggle to protect coal miners from black
lung disease provides a context to keep in mind as the Trump administra-
tion and the coal industry halt objective, nascent epidemiological research
by the National Academies of Science into the possible negative effects of
coal mining pollution on community health in Central Appalachia.244
The following Part III identifies major sources of coal mining-related
environmental pollution and the pathways through which individuals
living near coal mining-related activities may be exposed. An understand-
ing of the sources of coal pollution and the pathways to human exposure
provides context for the subsequent discussion of the state of epidemio-
logical research that has identified correlations between coal mining and
negative community health outcomes.
III. SOURCES OF POLLUTION AND PATHWAYS OF EXPOSURE
Underground and MTR mining, reclamation, coal cleaning, trans-
portation, and waste disposal create pathways delivering air and water
borne mining-generated pollution into communities near MTR and other
coal mining operations.245 A 2010 epidemiological study of the environ-
mental and health effects of coal waste disposal observed that:
Coal contaminants from numerous stages of coal mining,
cleaning, transport, and waste can enter waste streams. . . .
[E]ach step of coal processing, from mining to waste dis-
posal, including coal washing can potentially impact human
health. . . . [C]oal washing generating coal slurry can re-
lease arsenic, barium, lead, and manganese, and contami-
nate nearby wells and local water supplies.246
According to the U.S. Geological Survey (“USGS”), “in the Appalachian Pla-
teaus, iron and manganese concentrations exceeded USEPA drinking-water
243 See id.
244 Id.
245 See ALAN DUCATMAN ET AL., W.VA. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. RES., COAL SLURRY WASTE
UNDERGROUND INJECTION ASSESSMENT FINAL REPORT: PHASE II 24 (July 30, 2010), http://
wvwri.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Coal-Slurry-Injection-Phase-II-Final-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y3WX-74AK] [hereinafter INJECTION REPORT].
246 Id.
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guidelines in at least 40 percent of the wells and in about 70 percent of
wells near reclaimed surface coal mines.”247 USGS reported that elevated
sulfate concentration and slightly acidic water were more common in
wells located within 1,000 feet of reclaimed mines.248
A. Air Pollution Exposure Pathways
MTR mining and other surface mining methods require blasting
to fragment the strata overlying coal seams, or overburden, so the min-
eral may be extracted. In stark contrast to conventional strip mining
methods, MTR-related blasting requires tens of thousands of pounds of
an explosive mixture of ammonium nitrate and diesel fuel called ANFO.249
The E.P.A. has called these blasting activities “a particular concern, in
that they can produce particulate matter (dust), fumes, and potentially
damaging low-frequency noise and pressure waves.”250 Blasting produces
airborne coal and rock dust containing sulfur compounds, fine particu-
lates with metals, and nitrogen dioxide.251
Additional air pollution is caused by dust blown from disturbed
mined lands, uncovered piles of crushed coal at processing sites, coal
storage areas, loaded coal trains and trucks, and shipping facilities.252 Air
pollution is also generated by dust emissions from coal trucks that
transport coal from mine sites to preparation plants, coal loading and
247 Summary of Major Findings: Stream and River Highlights, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
https://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/circ1204/summary.htm [https://perma.cc/7NMU-MN5X] (last
visited Apr. 3, 2019).
248 Id.
249 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
ON MOUNTAINTOP MINING/VALLEY FILLS IN APPALACHIA III.V-6 (2003) (“Ammonia is
released during this combustion process. Exposure to ammonia causes eye and respira-
tory irritation”). See, e.g., Sophia Yan, In West Virginia, a Battle Over Mountaintop Mining,
TIME MAG. (Mar. 12, 2010), https://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/explosives
/explomyb05.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7UE-7JUE] (three million pounds of explosives are
detonated each day in West Virginia for coal mining) (referencing Deborah A. Kramer,
U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, 2005 MINERALS YEARBOOK: EXPLOSIVES 24.5 (Sept. 2006), https://
minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/explosives/explomyb05.pdf [https://perma.cc
/B6M7-4PA5]).
250 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, supra note 249, at II.C-83.
251 Id. at W-1. See also Melissa Ahern & Michael Hendryx, Cancer Mortality Rates in Appa-
lachian Mountaintop Coal Mining Areas, 1(2) J. ENVTL. & OCCUPATIONAL SCI. 63, 63 (2012).
252 Dan Ferber, Research Finds Additional Harm From Coal Dust Exposure, MIDWEST
ENERGY NEWS (Feb. 20, 2013), https://energynews.us/2013/02/20/midwest/research-finds
-additional-harm-from-coal-dust-exposure/ [https://perma.cc/3WBY-PN6C] [hereinafter
Coal Dust Exposure].
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shipping facilities, and coal “unit trains” of 120 uncovered cars loaded
with coal.253 Coal trucks also emit soot from diesel exhaust, further degrad-
ing the air quality in mining communities and compounding environmen-
tal stressors.254
In an early epidemiological study, researchers found “[e]vidence
indicat[ing] elevated levels of respirable ambient particulate matter, sulfur
dioxide, nitrous oxide, benzene, carbon monoxide, and polycyclic aromatic
hydrocarbons in areas proximate to coal extraction, processing and trans-
portation.”255 Atmospheric contaminants in coal dust also include arsenic,
mercury, and other heavy metals.256 Another study observed that atmo-
spheric “[p]article number concentrations and deposited lung dose were
significantly greater around mining areas compared with non-mining
areas, demonstrating elevated risks to humans.”257 Researchers reported
higher dosage rates correlated with elevated disease rates in communities
located near mining-related activities.258 Additional research has also
raised concerns of negative health impacts linking exposure to coal dust to
cardiovascular diseases, lung diseases, and potentially cancer, as evi-
denced by observed patterns within the general populations living in
affected areas.259
B. Surface and Groundwater Water Exposure Pathways
MTR valley fills and runoff, as well as discharges of contaminated
underground mine drainage, impact water quality, clogging streams and
leaching heavy metals and other toxins into waterways.260 A 2011 study
found that “more than 90% of 27 Appalachian streams below valley fill
sites were impaired as per Clean Water Act standards, while none of 10
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Ahern & Hendryx, supra note 251, at 64 (“examin[ing] the association between age-
adjusted cancer mortality rates and mountaintop coal mining (MTM) in Central Appala-
chia” and finding strong correlations between living in mountaintop mining areas and
increased rates of “lung, colon, bladder, and kidney cancer and leukemia,” as compared
to non-mountaintop mining areas).
256 Coal Dust Exposure, supra note 252.
257 Laura Kurth et al., Atmospheric Particulate Matter Size Distribution and Concentration
in West Virginia Coal Mining and Non-Mining Areas, 24 J. EXPOSURE SCI. & ENVTL. EPI-
DEMIOLOGY 405, 405 (2014).
258 Id.
259 Holzman, supra note 140, at A480.
260 See infra notes 261–62.
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streams sampled in nonmined valleys were impaired.”261 Contaminants
in soil and exposed rock include sulfate, carbon, and strontium that make
their way into the ground and nearby waterways when storms cause run-
off to spread from mining sites.262
C. Coal-Waste Disposal Pathways: Surface Impoundments and
Underground Injection
1. Coal-Waste Surface Impoundments
New mining technology and methods have significantly increased
the scale of wastes generated during coal mining.263 MTR, underground
continuous mining, and longwall operations generally require the separa-
tion of coal from waste material in coal-cleaning facilities before the mar-
ketable mineral portion is transported to market.264 Coal operators in the
U.S. annually dispose of an estimated two billion tons of coal slurry,
produced as by-product in the preparation of raw coal for market.265
Approximately 30–40% of the underground mined material transported
to the surface is unmarketable coarse and fine waste.266 Large MTR
mines also produce significant non-combustible wastes.267
Coal slurry waste intermixed with chemicals used in the cleaning
process is disposed of either in surface impoundments or is injected into
abandoned underground mines in one of two ways: (1) it is piped into
permanent surface impoundments that eventually are supposed to be
261 Holzman, supra note 140, at A482. A primary goal of the Clean Water Act is to protect
the quality of surface waters to insure their suitability for “designated uses” including
recreation, human consumption of fish, and adequate protection of aquatic life. See U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, What are Water Quality Standards? (Jul. 23, 2018), https://www
.epa.gov/standards-water-body-health/what-are-water-quality-standards [https://perma.cc
/7DK6-FZHU]. The statute prohibits discharges of pollutants into waters of the United
States in violation of water quality standards impairing stream water quality and desig-
nated uses. Id.
262 Mountaintop mining pollution has distinct chemical signatures, PHYS (Aug. 15, 2013),
https://phys.org/news/2013-08-mountaintop-pollution-distinct-chemical-signatures.html
[https://perma.cc/3YZ7-DR5B].
263 See generally Yoginder P. Chugh & Paul T. Behum, Coal waste management practices in
the USA: an overview, 1 INT. J. COAL SCI. TECH. 163 (2014) [hereinafter Coal Waste Practices]
(providing an overview of coal waste management practices).
264 Id.
265 Stanton D. Ernest & William C. Illingworth, Underground Disposal of Slurry and Coal
Refuse in Mine Voids: Does the Coal Owner/Lessee Have the Legal Right to Dispose of Slurry
and Coal Refuse in the Mine Voids?, 28 ENERGY & MINERAL L. INST. 318 (2008).
266 Coal Waste Practices, supra note 263, at 164.
267 Id.
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dewatered, covered with impermeable layers of material and revegetated,
or (2) it is injected into underground strata and previously mined voids.268
A joint coal industry/state government analysis of coal waste
management practices emphasized that:
[C]oal waste management is a very important part of the
cost of the mining operation[,] particularly when you con-
sider the environmental impacts of coal waste. Further-
more, [these wastes] may contain a large percentage of
pyrite that can oxidize to generate acid-drainage, elevated
levels of sulfate in water discharges, and trace metals.269
The chemicals used in coal cleaning and processing vary by site.270 Among
the chemical mixtures are those containing flocculants, surfactants, and
other substances used to wash the coal and prepare it for additional
processing before it is ready to transport to markets.271
It is not sufficient to understand the method and technology in-
volved in coal waste disposal. To fully appreciate the impact of coal waste
disposal and its importance to an analysis of current coalfield community
concerns, a glance backward in time is appropriate. Few Americans are
aware of the 1972 collapse of a large coal waste impoundment at Buffalo
Creek, West Virginia.272 A towering flood wall created by a succession of
268 See id. at 163–76. Possible environmental impacts of coal waste containing materials
cut from just above and below the mined coal seam include:
(1) Potential degradation of surface and ground water quality due to
pyrite oxidation, dissolution of soluble salts, cation exchange reactions,
mobilization of trace elements; erosion and sedimentation of freshly
reclaimed soils due to freshly reclaimed soils and slopes, (2) possible
increased air quality impacts due to a higher percentage of sulfur in
roof and floor rocks, along with higher volatile trace elements such as
mercury, arsenic, and hazardous air pollutants; (3) spontaneous combus-
tion of carbonaceous materials in waste and high air permeability of
coal waste piles, (4) low fertility of reclaimed lands composed of acid—
or toxic-forming materials, (5) highly compacted waste piles that nega-
tively impact root penetration and growth.
Id. at 165.
269 Id. at 164.
270 Id.
271 Ahern & Hendryx, supra note 251, at 64.
272 Slurry Spill Suffering: The Buffalo Creek Flood, U.S. MINE SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN.
(Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.msha.gov/news-media/events/2016/02/25/slurry-spill-suffer
ing-buffalo-creek-flood [https://perma.cc/P52E-3ZC5]. See GERALD M. STERN, THE BUFFALO
CREEK DISASTER: HOW THE SURVIVORS OF ONE OF THE WORST DISASTERS IN COAL-MINING
HISTORY BROUGHT SUIT AGAINST THE COAL COMPANY—AND WON 41–42 (1977).
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huge, collapsing waste impoundments upstream hurtled 132 million gallons
of slurry down a narrow valley, killing 125 people and injuring thousands
more.273 The flood completely destroyed seventeen coal camp communi-
ties, leaving 4,000 people homeless.274
Most Americans are similarly unaware of the more than ninety
million gallons of “black water” that polluted Appalachian streams caused
by defective coal waste structures.275 In Eastern Kentucky in 2000, liquid
coal slurry drained from a coal waste lagoon, spilling 300 hundred million
gallons of the black water into a nearby adjacent stream.276 The waste
coming downstream from Kentucky into West Virginia suffocated more
than one hundred miles of stream life.277 Concerns persist about the
stability of these impoundments and the dangers they pose to surface
water, groundwater, and downstream communities.278
Ten years ago, more than one billion tons of coal were being mined
annually.279 More than 600 million tons were washed (processed).280
Today, in excess of 700 federally regulated coal waste impoundments are
located in the United States, mostly in Appalachia.281 Every year, seventy
273 SHANNON ELIZABETH BELL, FIGHTING KING COAL 29 (2016).
274 ROBIN MORRIS COLLIN & ROBERT WILLIAM COLLIN, ENERGY CHOICES 44 (2014).
275 See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., ENG’G & MED., COAL WASTE IMPOUNDMENTS: RISKS, RESPONSES,
ALTERNATIVES 27–31 (2002) [hereinafter WASTE IMPOUNDMENTS] (“Black water” refers to the
liquid waste contained in or released untreated from surface coal waste impoundments).
276 MINE SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., INTERNAL REVIEW OF MSHA’S ACTIONS AT THE BIG
BRANCH REFUSE IMPOUNDMENT, MARTIN COUNTY COAL CORPORATION, INEZ, MARTIN
COUNTY, KENTUCKY 1, 3 (2003) [hereinafter INTERNAL REVIEW]; MINE SAFETY & HEALTH
ADMIN., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (2000).
277 See INTERNAL REVIEW, supra note 276, at 1, 3. See also Dylan Lovan, Toxic coal sludge
pollute Ky. town 10 years later, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Oct. 10, 2010, https://www.san
diegouniontribune.com/sdut-toxic-coal-sludge-pollutes-ky-town-10-years-later-2010oct10
-story.html [https://perma.cc/9KAV-JHL6]. Eight feet of sludge impacted twenty miles of
streams and floodplains. This slurry contained substantial amounts of heavy metals such
as arsenic, mercury, lead, cadmium, copper, copper, and chromium. Riverside communities
in Kentucky and West Virginia had their water supplies contaminated. Cleanup costs
reached an estimated $58 million. Collateral Damage, supra note 14, at n.239.
278 Juliet Eilperin & Steven Mufson, Many Coal Sludge Impoundments Have Weak Walls,




279 WASTE IMPOUNDMENTS, supra note 275, at 24.
280 Id.
281 Id. at 23–24; see generally Stanley J. Michalek et al., Accidental Releases of Slurry and
Water From Coal Impoundments Through Abandoned Underground Coal Mines, MINE
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to ninety million tons of slurry waste are disposed of in surface impound-
ments or injected underground as a water-coal slurry.282 Generally, these
wastes and how they are “managed” is beyond the ken of the public.
A 2013 study by the U.S. Department of the Interior found that
impoundment structures have dangerously weak walls because of poor
construction methods—“[f]ailing field density tests occurred at all seven
of the sites investigated[,] . . . [and] of 73 field density tests performed at
the seven sites only 16 yielded passing results.”283 Coal waste discarded
in these structures is generated by underground longwall, continuous,
and MTR mines. Coal waste impoundments are ubiquitous in Central
Appalachia—as of 2006, there were 126 slurry impoundments permitted
to hold over 110 billion gallons of slurry in West Virginia alone.284
A recent analysis of U.S. coal waste practices noted that some
slurry impoundments have experienced catastrophic breaches that cause
major contamination of surface and underground waters.285 The authors
caution, however, that “[p]otential environmental impacts of current
waste disposal practices are not limited to a relatively few catastrophic
events involving impoundment structure collapse.286 Implementation of
proper management practices is necessary for prevention of groundwater
contamination and mitigation of surface water impact to the receiving
water body.”287
SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN. (1996), https://miningquiz.com/pdf/Impoundments/ASDSO2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U4Z9-54GG] (background information on impoundments). Most coal
from Western coalfields does not require cleaning. WASTE IMPOUNDMENTS, supra note
275, at 23–24.
282 WASTE IMPOUNDMENTS, supra note 275, at 23–24.
283 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR OFF. OF SURFACE MINING, OVERSIGHT REPORT OF COM-
PACTION OF COAL MINE WASTE SLURRY IMPOUNDMENT EMBANKMENTS EVALUATION YEAR
2011 (2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Coal-Refuse-Dams
-OSM-Compaction-Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/JVP5-EQ9X].
284 Eilperin & Mufson, supra note 278 (“There are 596 coal slurry impoundments in 21
states, according to the Mine Safety and Health Administration, of which the largest
number, 114, are in West Virginia”).
285 Coal Waste Practices, supra note 263, at 170. The 1972 Buffalo Creek disaster killed
125 people and injured nearly 2,000 others. Safety issues associated with the slurry im-
poundments include embankment collapse and coal slurry escaping into underground
voids due to mine subsidence. In Kentucky, in 1994, thirty-two million gallons of coal
slurry poured into in a closed underground mine. In Inez, Kentucky, in 2000, one million
liters of decant water and 130 million liters of coal waste drained into underground strata
and surface waters as a result of subsidence. Id.
286 Id.
287 Id.
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2. Underground Injection of Coal Waste
In addition to disposing of waste in surface coal slurry waste im-
poundments or ponds, some companies inject waste into abandoned under-
ground mines.288 A joint state and federal report examining underground
injection of coal slurry explains that the waste is “gravity fed into the
underground mine via a network of slurry pipelines and injection wells.”289
“Under most conditions,” the authors explain, “the solid portion of slurry
settles to the bottom of the mine void, while the liquid portion migrates.”290
Injecting this chemical- and metal-laden mixture underground is prob-
lematic, as it often contains lead, arsenic, barium, beryllium, selenium,
iron, manganese, aluminum, sulfate and zinc, manganese, and iron that
could ultimately end up in groundwater used as a source of domestic
water supply.291
D. Contamination of Residential Springs and Wells
A significant number of rural residents in the coalfields of Appala-
chia obtain drinking water from untreated wells and springs rather than
public drinking water sources.292 While little firm data exists, a report of
the Appalachian Regional Council found that, in 1995, one in four Appa-
lachians relied on well water and up to two out of three people drank
from their wells in many counties where MTR mining operations were
active.293 In 2012, the New York Times reported on coal slurry injection
into abandoned mines near Prenter, a small community in the southern
West Virginia coalfields:
288 See generally Shannon Elizabeth Bell, Coal Slurry Impoundments Environmental
Injustice and the Pursuit of a Post-Carbon World: The Unintended Consequences of the Clean
Air Act as a Cautionary Tale for Solar Energy Development, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 529, 538–44
(2017) (discussion of coal slurry impoundments and contamination of drinking water).
289 ANDREW NICK SCHAER, PROC. AM. SOC’Y MINING & RECLAMATION , FINDINGS OF THE
WVDEP AND OSMRE SCR-15 “PHASE I” STUDY ON THE UNDERGROUND INJECTION OF COAL
SLURRY 964 (2010), https://www.asmr.us/Portals/0/Documents/Conference-Proceedings
/2010/0963-Schaer.pdf [https://perma.cc/TV9L-G3QN].
290 Id.
291 See INJECTION REPORT, supra note 245, at 41. See also Holzman, supra note 140, at A477.
292 APPALACHIAN REG. COMM’N, DRINKING WATER AND WASTEWATER INFRASTRUCTURE: AN
ANALYSIS OF CAPITAL FUNDING AND FUNDING GAPS 27 (Aug. 2005), https://www.arc.gov/as
sets/research_reports/DrinkingWaterandWastewaterInfrastructure.pdf [https://perma.cc
/T649-C4CX].
293 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 22, at 60.
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Coal companies have injected more than 1.9 billion gallons
of coal slurry and sludge into the ground since 2004, ac-
cording to a review of thousands of state records. Millions
more gallons have been dumped into lagoons. These un-
derground injections have contained chemicals at concen-
trations that pose serious health risks, and thousands of
injections have violated state regulations and the Safe
Drinking Water Act, according to reports sent to the state
by companies themselves . . . . 93 percent of the waste they
injected near this community had illegal concentrations of
chemicals including arsenic, lead, chromium, beryllium or
nickel. Sometimes those concentrations exceeded legal
limits by as much as 1,000 percent. Those chemicals have
been shown to contribute to cancer, organ failures and
other diseases.294
Author Shannon Elizabeth Bell interviewed Prenter resident
Maria Lambert about her concerns regarding well water in the commu-
nity that was believed to have been contaminated with injected coal
slurry.295 Lambert described a community meeting during which she first
realized the possible health risks of exposure to local well water:
Everybody was showing [samples of] their water. Different
people stood up and told about their water and told about
what they believed was happening, and told about the
different illnesses—the brain tumors, the gallbladder prob-
lems, stomach problems, children’s teeth falling out, and
all of these things. . . . And it’s like, a light bulb going off
all here, there, yonder, everywhere. And it’s like my whole
life flashing before my eyes, because my children had lost
294 Charles Duhigg, Clean Water Laws Are Neglected, at a Cost in Suffering, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 12, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/13/us/13water.html [https://perma.cc
/L2KP-RTUK].
[F]ederal documents and other literature provide reason to believe in-
jection “does not always work as intended’‘ and can contaminate ground
and surface water. But there is virtually no useful monitoring data
from the 12 active injection sites in West Virginia . . . Nor is there cur-
rently an effective way to trace the movement of slurry once it’s injected
into the worked-out mines where it hypothetically stays put.
See generally INJECTION REPORT, supra note 245.
295 SHANNON ELIZABETH BELL, OUR ROOTS RUN DEEP AS IRONWEED: APPALACHIAN WOMEN
AND THE FIGHT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 72 (2013).
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their teeth, my parents had had cancer, we’d had our gall-
bladders removed, and all of these things was, it’s just like,
oh no, it’s not just us—it’s the whole community . . . .296
State regulators, however, denied that the coal slurry injected into
abandoned mines under Prenter and its environs had contaminated wells
that served hundreds of families in the community.297 Residents filed a
class-action lawsuit seeking to hold coal companies responsible for the
pollution of their drinking water, alleging that the contaminated water
flowed from the pipes in their homes.298 They also alleged some had suf-
fered from cancer and other illnesses as a consequence of their exposure
to injected coal slurry, or that such exposure substantially increased the
risk that they would suffer from a serious illness in the future.299
Although the companies vigorously denied these claims, they even-
tually entered into a confidential settlement agreement with the plaintiff
residents.300 A suit filed by residents in a neighboring county made similar
allegations that Massey Energy Company had contaminated their wells
by injecting 1.4 billion gallons of toxic coal slurry into worked-out under-
ground mines between 1978 and 1987.301 Massey settled the claims just
before trial, agreeing to fund medical monitoring plans for the residents
and to pay $35 million in damages—without admitting liability.302
Part IV, below, discusses a growing body of epidemiological research
developed over the last decade that identifies significant correlations
296 Id.
297 TRIAD ENG’G, INC., HYDROLOGIC EVALUATION PRENTER ROAD AREA (Jan. 27, 2012),
https://dep.wv.gov/dmr/studies%20and%20investigations/Documents/Prenter%20Road
%20Study/Report%20Text%20w%20Tables-Small%20Figs.pdf [https://perma.cc/HHV9
-9D3R]( “In summary, our investigation did not reveal evidence of widespreadhuman-in
duced impacts to groundwater quality in the study area”).
298 Ken Ward, Jr., Deal Reached in Prenter Coal Slurry Lawsuit, CHARLESTON GAZETTE




300 Vicki Smith, AP Newsbreak: Massey settles WV coal slurry case, DESERET NEWS (July 27,
2011, 12:45 PM), https://www.deseretnews.com/article/700166332/AP-Newsbreak-Massey
-settles-WV-coal-slurry-case.html [https://perma.cc/66ET-2MAF].
301 Vicki Smith, Mining firm offers $35m to settle, BOSTON.COM (Aug. 10, 2011), http://ar
chive.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2011/08/10/coal_slurry_case_to_cost_massey_35m/
[https://perma.cc/F3CG-VUCN] (“[T]he $35 million is in addition to the $5 million that
Massey and its subsidiary, Rawl Sales & Processing, had previously agreed to put into
a medical monitoring fund.”).
302 Id.
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between coal mining pollution and numerous health issues in nearby Cen-
tral Appalachian communities. Part V that follows suggests an analogy
can be drawn between the historic coal industry denial of medical science
that confirmed that coal dust causes coal miner respiratory disease and
the industry’s denial that pollution from coal mines is related to commu-
nity health outcomes. Part V suggests that the industry’s rejection of
epidemiological research is reminiscent of the strategy the industry used
to dispute scientific evidence revealing correlation and causation regard-
ing coal dust and miners’ lung disease.
IV. COAL MINING EXTERNALITIES: IMPACTS ON COMMUNITY HEALTH
While a nascent body of epidemiological research and attendant
scholarship identifies and discusses correlations between living in coal
mining areas and negative health outcomes, the seminal research to date
has not yet focused directly on causation. These peer-reviewed findings
cannot be viewed as a surprise. The fact that serious health issues plague
men, women, and children who live in coal mining communities has long
been recognized and condemned. Four and a half decades ago, a congres-
sional report recognized and embraced the reality of the degraded health
and quality of life in Appalachian coal communities.303 The language used
by Congress was direct and emphatic:
As a consequence of the hazardous environment associated
with both underground and surface mining of coal, the
health and safety of people living and working near the coal
mines of the region are in more or less constant peril. . . .
Tragically, coal mining in America has left its crippling
mark upon the very communities which labored most to pro-
duce the energy which once impelled the Nation’s indus-
trial plant and now generates much of its electrical power.304
303 H.R. REP. NO. 93-1072, at 56–57 (1974). See H.R. REP. NO. 95-218, at 58–59 (1977) (detail-
ing the devastating impacts of surface mining which inspired Congress to pass SMCRA),
reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 539, 596–97 and 30 U.S.C. 1201(c), (Pub. L. 95-87, tit. I,
§ 101, Aug. 3, 1977, 91 Stat. 447) (many coal-mining operations cause erosion and landslides,
contribute to floods, water pollution, destruction of fish and wildlife habitats, damage
property of citizens, create hazards dangerous to life and property and degrade the
quality of life in local communities).
304 H.R. REP. NO. 93-1072, at 56–57 (1974) (emphasis added).
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No objective person with knowledge of the history of the Central
Appalachian coal region can dispute these fundamental historical facts.
But, as the discussion of black lung disease above makes clear, the coal
industry and those aligned with it continue to deny and minimize this
history.
Ultimately, whether objective scientific inquiry finds causation as
well as correlation between coal mining and community health outcomes,
Congress’s 1977 finding that “the health and safety of people living and
working near the coal mines of the region are in more or less constant peril”
remains true today.305 The discussion below examines the recent research,
and identifies obstacles and resistance to scientific inquiry that impede
efforts to fully investigate possible causal links between exposure to coal
mining-related environmental externalities and community health.
A. Epidemiological Human Health Impact Studies
In the last decade, epidemiological studies have shown correla-
tions between underground, MTR mining, or coal waste disposal and
disproportionate rates of disease and other adverse health issues among
populations living nearby. Residents of those communities experience
higher rates of blood abnormalities, cancers of numerous sorts, increased
rates of birth defects, neurological problems, cardiovascular problems,
asthma, and tooth decay. Concerning negative mental health and reduced
quality of life issues accompany these findings of correlation. Considered
together, these correlations paint an alarming picture of Central Appala-
chian coalfield community health. The following discussion identifies the
findings of the last decade from what are essentially the first serious epide-
miological investigations of connections between coal mining environmen-
tal externalities and Central Appalachian coalfield community health.306
305 Id.; see NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., ENG’G & MED., supra note 221, at 15–16.
306 As discussed above in Section IV.A, what little coalfield health research that has been
undertaken was limited to evaluations of impacts of respirable dust in underground coal
mines and the incidence of occupational respiratory disease among coal miners. For all
the professed concerns of coal industry managers and politicians for the well-being, health,
and safety of American coal miners, the parties have never acknowledged or encouraged
scientific analysis to determine the causes of the inordinate incidence of illness and
disease that has blighted coal communities. Identifying remedies and a credible action
plan is impossible without professional medical research and analysis to identify possible
causal connections and the scope of community health degradation.
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B. Blood-Related Impacts
In 2015, researchers from the School of Public Health at Indiana
University conducted a study examining the relationship between blood
inflammation and living in areas near surface mining sites.307 The study
involved collecting blood samples from residents living within three miles
of active surface mining operations in West Virginia and Indiana and
comparing the results to control samples from participants living in areas
farther away in each state.308 The study tested for C-reactive protein, a
marker predictive of increased risk of cardiovascular disease and lung
cancer when found in high levels.309 Researchers also collected indoor and
outdoor air particulate samples from participants’ homes.
After controlling for relevant variables, researchers found that
those areas near surface mining sites had higher counts of particulate
ambient matter, and participants living in these areas had significantly
higher C-reactive protein levels than participants living in areas farther
away.310 A C-reactive protein level of 3.0 mg/L or greater is considered to
be an indicator of increased risk for cardiovascular and other diseases,311
and those living in areas near surface mines may have an increased risk
of developing cardiovascular and other diseases.312 This study found that,
in areas near surface mining operations, the average C-reactive protein
level was 4.9 mg/L, whereas those living in non-mining areas averaged
just 0.6 mg/L.313
C. Cancers
Numerous studies have been conducted on the relationship be-
tween surface mining activities and increased rates of various types of
cancer.314 Significant correlations have been identified:
307 Michael Hendryx & Jennifer Entwhistle, Association between residence near surface
coal mining and blood inflammation, 2 EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES & SOC’Y 246 (2015) (studying
the presence of C-reactive protein levels in the blood of residents living within three miles
of active surface mining operations in West Virginia and Indiana and finding higher levels
for these residents than for state residents living farther from active surface mine sites).
308 Id. at 247.




313 Hendryx & Entwhistle, supra note 307, at 249.
314 Ahern & Hendryx, supra note 251, at 64.
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Air and water pollutants that result from [mountaintop
mining] include some that are known or possible carcino-
gens. Arsenic in water is a risk for lung, bladder, kidney,
liver, and skin cancer. Radon is associated with an increased
risk of lung cancer. Air pollution is a risk factor for lung
cancer and perhaps for other cancers; however, the exact
pollutants and cancers are not well-understood. Cancers
other than lung cancer that result from air pollution show
mixed effects; but some effects have been seen for leuke-
mia, and for cancers of the bladder, uterus, prostate, colon,
stomach, and esophagus.315
Researchers have explained that human exposure to coal mining–related
toxins has been associated with elevated risk of kidney and lung cancers,
and that “nickel, beryllium, and chromium VI are linked to lung cancer.”316
In addition, the researchers report that iron and selenium have been found
to be higher in polyp vs. control tissue.317 They further note that exposure
to diesel exhaust from motorized mining equipment might increase blad-
der cancer risks.318 Multiple studies suggest “a correlation between benzene
exposure and breast and leukemia cancer risks.”319
Lung cancer is one of the leading causes of death in Appalachia.320
A 2008 study found that residents in areas of top coal production—
categorized as Appalachian counties producing over three million tons of
coal from 2000–2004—experienced significantly increased lung cancer
mortality rates.321 The study also revealed that, after adjusting for rele-
vant covariates, “Appalachian coal-mining counties are still associated with
an excess of 144 deaths from lung cancer over the years 2000–2004.”322






320 APPALACHIAN REGIONAL COMM’N, SECTION VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 221,
223–24, https://www.arc.gov/assets/research_reports/Summary%20and%20Conclusions
_sectionVI.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2PJ-2EE8].
321 Michael Hendryx et al. Lung cancer mortality is elevated in coal-mining areas of Appa-
lachia, 62 ELSEVIER 1, 1–2 (2008) (finding “that lung cancer mortality for the years
2000–2004 is higher in areas of heavy Appalachian coal mining after adjustments for
smoking, poverty, education, age, sex, race and other covariates.”).
322 Id. at 4.
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other non-Appalachian areas where large amounts of mining occurred;
increased mortality was specific to Appalachia.323
A 2012 study focused on two periods of time: 1999–2002 and
2003–2007.324 Researchers examined rates of occurrence of cancers in
areas near MTR mines, near sites where other forms of mining occurred,
and in non-mining areas.325 They reported increased rates of lung, colon,
bladder, and kidney cancer and leukemia when compared to non-mining
areas during the second study period (2003–2007) after controlling for
other risk factors.326 Total cancer rates were higher in areas near MTR
operations during both time periods, as compared to both non-mining
areas and areas where other forms of mining was conducted.327 The study
also found that, compared to non-mining areas of residence, cancer mor-
tality rates for leukemia, lung, bladder, and colorectal cancer rates were
higher near MTR mines.328
Effects of MTR mining may be linked to exacerbation of health
problems of those already afflicted with cancer. West Virginia University,
Indiana University, and Madihol University researchers found that air-
borne particulate matter of the type emitted from MTR mining activities
(including blasting and heavy equipment operation) “induces neoplastic
transformation of human bronchial epithelial cells and promotes tumor
transformation.”329 They hypothesized that MTR mining impacts could
323 Id.
324 Ahern & Hendryx, supra note 251, at 63.
325 Id. at 64.
326 Id. at 68. The study’s authors suggest that the increase might be explained by the
emergence of large-scale MTR coal mining methodology replacing contour strip mining
during the mid- to late-1990s and early 2000s and the extended latency period of growth
of many cancers. See id.
327 See id. at 63–66.
328 Id. at 68–69. A litigation-related study commissioned by Prenter, West Virginia resi-
dents who were plaintiffs in a civil tort action seeking damages and other relief from coal
companies alleged that, on a street with ten houses, six people, ranging in age from eleven
years old to fifty-five years old had contracted brain cancer, and that four of them later
died. SUTTER LAW FIRM, PLLC, STUDY: COAL SLURRY CONTAMINATED PRENTER HOLLOW
WATER (Jan. 17, 2012), https://www.thesutterlawfirm.com/News/2012.01.17.pdf [https://
perma.cc/QDJ7-WY5Y].
329 Sudjit Luanpitpong et al., Appalachian Mountaintop Mining Particulate Matter Induces
Neoplastic Transformation of Human Bronchial Epithelial Cells and Promotes Tumor
Formation, 48 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 12912, 12912 (2014) (studying the relation between
mountaintop mining particulate matter exposure and human bronchial epithelial cells
and finding “that chronic exposure (3 months) to non-cytotoxic, physiological relevant
concentration (1 ìg/mL) of PMMTM, but not control particle PMCON, induced neoplastic
transformation, accelerated cell proliferation, and enhanced cell migration of the exposed
lung cells.”).
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accelerate degradation of vulnerable individuals residing nearby who
have already been diagnosed with cancer.330
D. Birth Defects
Two epidemiological studies reported correlations linking MTR
mining to birth defects in communities located near such operations.331
A 2011 study conducted by university epidemiologists found:
counties in and near mountaintop mining areas had higher
rates of birth defects for five out of six types of birth de-
fects, including circulatory/respiratory, central nervous
system, musculoskeletal, gastrointestinal, and urogenital
defects. These defect rates became more pronounced in the
more recent period studied, 2000–2003, suggesting the
health effects of mountaintop mining-related air and wa-
ter contamination may be cumulative.332
The study reported birth defects in areas where MTR mining was most
prevalent as compared with non-mining areas, and the occurrence of
birth defects in the areas where MTR mining operations were located
was found to be nearly twice that of non-mining areas.333 Even after control-
ling for variables such as poverty and education level, incidence of birth
defects remained higher in areas where MTR activities occurred.334
Similarly, a contemporary investigation focused on birth defects
among populations residing in proximity to MTR operations. It found
that “of 1.9 million live births, children born in [MTR] mining counties
were 26% more likely to have a birth defect than those born in non-
mining areas, after adjusting for other risk factors such as maternal age,
maternal alcohol consumption during pregnancy, maternal diabetes, and
low socioeconomic status.”335
330 Id. at 12917.
331 See Melissa M. Ahern et al., The association between mountaintop mining and birth
defects among live births in central Appalachia, 1996–2003, ENVTL. RESEARCH 838 (2011),
https://ohvec.org/mountaintop-mining-birth-defects/ [https://perma.cc/5ZQJ-NEUA] (studying
the incidence of birth defects in mining versus non-mining areas, and finding that rates
were nearly twice as high in mining areas as compared to non-mining areas).
332 Id.
333 Ahern et al., supra note 331, at 842–43.
334 Id. at 838.
335 Holzman, supra note 140, at A483.
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E. Neurological Impacts
Epidemiological investigations have identified a correlation be-
tween residence near MTR mines and impaired cognitive development
in children.336 Headaches, irritability, and poor memory due to chronic
ambient exposure to sulfate from nearby mining operations have also
been reported.337 As stated in a 2010 study examining the links between
living in coal mining areas and learning outcomes,
[e]nvironmental chemicals present currently or historically
in coal, coal extraction, and coal processing—including
phthalates, alkylphenols, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs),
polychlorinated dibenzodioxins, bisphenol A, lead, mer-
cury, zinc, aluminum, and cadmium—are known to impact
cognitive development and function. Three mechanistic
explanations have been proposed for impaired cognitive
development and learning capacity: (1) interference with
the endocrine system; (2) impairment of the glutamate-
nitric oxide-cGMP (cyclic guanosine monophosphate) path-
way that influences learning ability; and (3) interference
with the central nervous system. Effects may occur from
either prenatal or postnatal exposure.338
2010 research compared learning outcomes of students in coal-
mining counties against those in non-mining counties, finding that students
living in the former evidenced significantly impaired learning outcomes
across all subject areas as compared to students residing in non-mining
communities.339 The authors of the study explained that exposure to certain
toxins listed above, such as lead, can have irreversibly detrimental impacts
on a child’s cognitive development, which includes impairing a child’s
learning ability, decreasing IQ, and causing behavioral disorders that
have long-term impacts on the rest of a child’s life.340 Chemicals used in
the mountaintop mining process are linked to cardiovascular problems.341
336 Cain & Hendryx, supra note 143, at 72 (studying child cognitive development out-
comes in coal mining areas of West Virginia and the relation of exposure to chemicals
used in coal mining activities, along with other variables).
337 Holzman, supra note 140, at A480.
338 Cain & Hendryx, supra note 143, at 72.
339 Id. at 74–75.
340 Id. at 72.
341 Laura Esch & Michael Hendryx, Chronic Cardiovascular Disease Mortality in
Mountaintop Mining Areas of Central Appalachian States, 27 J. RURAL HEALTH 1 (2011).
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Arsenic, which is present in domestic well drinking water
supplies through parts of Appalachia, is associated with
an increase in myocardial infarction, atherosclerosis, and
blood pressure among adults. Exposure to cadmium, an
impurity in coal that is present throughout Appalachia, has
been shown to increase risk of cardiovascular and coronary
heart disease mortality among adult males. Exposure to
lead, which is also present in coal, is suggestive of cardio-
vascular outcomes such as elevated blood pressure, future
ischemic heart disease, and cardiovascular mortality.342
Another study reported a spectrum of negative consequences that
correlate with mountaintop mining.343 It noted hospitalization rates for
chronic pulmonary disorders and hypertensions rose in tandem with
rates of coal production within counties.344 Not only were rates of heart
disorders greater in coal mining areas as compared to non-mining areas,
but chronic cardiovascular disease mortality rates were also significantly
higher in areas where coal mining occurs.345 The study indicated that the
highest heart disease rates were in mountaintop mining areas, over all
other forms of mining.346
F. Mental Health & Quality of Life
Significant correlations have been found between residence near
MTR operations and negative mental health and quality of life ratings.
Researchers found higher rates of depression in people living in MTR-
affected areas when compared with those in non-mining areas.347 A 2011
study focused on health-related quality of life factors impacting residents
who also live in proximity to MTR mines.348 Individuals living near MTR
342 Id. at 351.
343 M.A. Palmer et al., Mountaintop Mining Consequences, 327 SCI. 148 (Jan. 8, 2010).
344 Id.
345 Esch & Hendryx, supra note 341, at 1, 5.
346 Id. at 6.
347 Id.
348 Keith Zullig & Michael Hendryx, Health-Related Quality of Life Among Central
Appalachian Residents in Mountaintop Mining Counties, 101 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 848,
848 (May 2011) (studying the relationship between mountaintop mining activities and
health related quality of life outcomes and finding that “[m]ountaintop mining areas are
associated with the greatest reductions in health-related quality of life even when
compared with counties with other forms of coal mining”).
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mining and related operations were found to be at greater risk of experi-
encing major depression and severe psychological distress when compared
with those in non-mining surrounding areas or across the nation.349
A 2011 community health impact investigation reflects similar
conclusions, finding that “people who lived in MTR mining areas had a
31% higher risk of reduced health-related quality of life (HRQOL)—or
perceived physical and mental health over time—compared with people
living in non-mining areas in the same states.”350
Degraded quality of life near mountaintop mining regions is stron-
ger than in regions where other types of mining occur.351 Residents living
near MTR operations suffer from eighteen more unhealthy days annually
than residents in non-mining areas, totaling “up to nearly 4 additional
years’ worth of impaired mental and/or physical health” throughout the
course of a seventy-eight-year life span.352
G. Additional Health Impact Findings
Finally, residents’ claims of other human health impacts, including
tooth decay, gastrointestinal problems, skin irritation, and asthma, have
all been correlated to surface mining operations.353 Many elements used
in the coal production process are known to correlate with tooth decay.354
These include aluminum, zinc sulfate, arsenic, lead, and cadmium.355 A
2011 report authored by researchers at West Virginia University and
Washington State University focused on adult tooth loss in coal-mining
areas in the United States and Appalachia.356 It found that the likelihood
349 Id.
350 Holzman, supra note 140, at A483.
351 Zullig & Hendryx, supra note 348, at 848.
352 Holzman, supra note 140, at A483.
353 Medical professionals treating patients from Prenter, West Virginia—discussed above—
reported that local residents drawing well water contaminated by chemicals associated
with coal slurry had experienced abnormal rates of health afflictions. A survey of one hun-
dred people, commissioned by a law firm representing Prenter residents, reported that
as many as 30% of people contacted had their gallbladders removed and as many as half
had experienced significant tooth enamel damage, chronic stomach problems and other
illnesses. A New York Times reporter interviewed Prenter residents and confirmed the
survey results. Duhigg, supra note 294; INJECTION REPORT, supra note 245, at 90, 130.
354 Michael Hendryx et al., Adult Tooth Loss for Residents of US Coal Mining and
Appalachian Counties, 40 COMM. DENTISTRY & ORAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 488, 489 (2012).
355 Id.
356 Id. at 488.
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“of reporting any adult tooth loss [was] significantly higher for Appalachian
coal county residents compared with the non-mining referent area after
adjustment for age, race/ethnicity, sex, income, education, supply of physi-
cians and dentists, receipt of dental care, smoking, alcohol consumption,
diabetes, health insurance, BMI, and rural setting.”357
Referring to West Virginia coal communities impacted by under-
ground injection of coal slurry, a member of the faculty of the West Virginia
University Department of Community Medicine observed that “[p]eople
exposed to the water in their homes, both from consumption and shower-
ing, get what I call ‘slurry syndrome,’ a mixture of diarrhea, rash, some
changes in their teeth, and increasing frequency of kidney stones.”358 “For-
tunately,” he reported, “most of this went away when they got municipal
water in the area.”359
Outside of Appalachia, correlation between surface coal mining
operations and asthma have been proposed in both Australia and Great
Britain. In Australia in 2010, a government report found that 40% of
children in two areas located near surface mining operations suffered
from some form of asthma, 12% higher than the national average.360 A
1992 study of possible links between coal mining and community health
in the United Kingdom found that children exposed to coal dust exhibited
significantly higher rates of respiratory problems.361 Subsequent studies
also identified significant links between surface mining operations and
children’s respiratory health.362
357 Id. at 494.
358 Holzman, supra note 140, at A480.
359 Id.
360 Australia’s coal mines blamed over asthma, BBC NEWS (May 18, 2010), http://news.bbc
.co.uk/2/hi/8688820.stm [https://perma.cc/VXH3-8VU8]. A recently published article con-
cluded that “[r]esults highlight the need to consider both urban and rural sources of
pollution in air quality studies, and appropriate policy steps to address likely rural air
pollution from coal mining.” M. Hendryx et al., Air Quality in Association With Rural Coal
Mining and Combustion in New South Wales Australia, J. RURAL HEALTH 1–10 (2019) (“a
rural region characterized by intensive coal mining and burning had poorer air quality
than other rural areas or urban areas, and thus that coal mining and burning activities
might impact pollution levels in rural areas potentially even more than pollution levels
in densely populated urban areas”).
361 J.M.F. Temple & A.M. Sykes, Asthma and open cast mining, BRITISH MED. J. 305, 396–97
(1992) (finding that “[b]efore mining operations[,] the mean weekly number of new epi-
sodes of asthma was 4–4 (95% confidence interval 3–6 to 5 2), and after mining began it
was 7–9 (7–0 to 8 6).”).
362 See, e.g., Tanja Pless-Mulloli et al., Living near opencast coal mining sites and children’s
respiratory health, 57 OCC. ENVTL. MED. 145 (2000).
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V. THE BLACK LUNG DENIAL STRATEGY RESURRECTED:
DISPUTE, DENIAL, AND OBSTRUCTION OF EPIDEMIOLOGICAL
ASSESSMENTS OF IMPACTS OF COAL MINING ON APPALACHIAN
COMMUNITY HEALTH
As discussed above, a decade of peer-reviewed epidemiological in-
vestigations shows correlations between environmental externalities of
coal-mining-related operations in Central Appalachia and coalfield commu-
nity health risks.363 This is unsurprising given the industry’s history of
denying that coal dust causes miners’ debilitating and often fatal lung
disease. The coal industry and its supporters have actively sought to dis-
credit and cast aspersions on the accumulating scientific data about
community health risks in coal-mining towns.
Following the publication of the study showing higher rates of
birth defects in counties where MTR mining operations were located,
lawyers representing the National Mining Association suggested in a
post on the firm website that coalfield inbreeding might be the source of
genetic defects, rather than exposure to mine-generated toxins.364 In a
West Virginia newspaper opinion piece, the communications director of the
West Virginia Coal Association—who had no training or education in sci-
ence or epidemiology—responded to the types of studies referenced above
that found a correlation between coal mining pollution and community
health.365 He labeled such studies “a classic example of prostitution of
363 See Part IV, supra.
364 The law firm quickly removed the letter from its website after it drew significant
attention and criticism and issued an explanation:
Our website alert is not intended to reflect views of the National Mining
Association, but is an attempt to identify certain potential weaknesses
of the study in question. Consanguinity is one of a number of commonly
addressed issues in studies of this type, regardless of geography. . . . We
did not raise this issue with particular reference to any region, and we
did not mean to imply any such thing. That said, we apologize for any
offense taken, as none was intended. We can appreciate the view that
our alert may not have provided enough context to explain the scientific
points we aimed to address, and so have removed it from our site.
(emphasis added) To view an excerpt of the letter and discussion, see Ken Ward, Jr.,
Mountaintop removal and birth defects: Just what are the coal industry’s lawyers talking
about?, CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL: COAL TATTOO (July 11, 2011), http://blogs.wvgazette
mail.com/coaltattoo/2011/07/11/mountaintop-removal-and-birth-defects-just-what-are-the
-coal-industrys-lawyers-talking-about/ [https://perma.cc/8MMS-9GM7]. See PRINCIPLES
& PRACTICE OF CLINICAL RES. (John I. Gallin & Frederick P. Ognibene, eds., 3d ed. 2012)
(“Consanguinity (i.e., mating between blood relatives) increases the likelihood that a child
will inherit two copies of the same deleterious allele”).
365 T.L. Headley, Common sense about coal and health, CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (Aug. 15,
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science in the service of a political agenda.”366 However, there is no evi-
dence that the epidemiologists engaged in community health concerns had
anything but a professional, scientific interest in the matters under
study.367 While attributing poor health of coalfield residents to “unhealthy
eating habits, overindulging in greasy, fried foods and sweets[,] . . . a
much lower college-going rate, and higher incidences of teen pregnancies,”
he emphasized that “the most important and effective means to improve
someone’s health is a good paying job” in West Virginia’s coal mines, which
he claimed paid “fully twice the state average wage.”368
Notwithstanding such unfounded criticism of the evolving epide-
miological studies, in August of 2016, in the final months of the Obama
administration, the Department of the Interior announced it was funding
an initial study of the possible health impacts of coal mining operations in
Central Appalachia.369 The planned two-year study was to be adminis-
tered by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
(“NASEM”).370
A twelve-member committee of volunteer experts was appointed
to conduct the study, none of whom were “active members of the coal
industry or any governmental agency that regulates coal mining.”371 The
charge of the committee was “to examine the potential relationship




367 T.L. Headley, Applying Some Common Sense to the Issue of Coal Mining and the




369 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior Office of Surface Mining Reclamation & En-
forcement, OSMRE Funds National Academy of Sciences Study of Potential Health Risks
Related to Surface Coal Mining in Central Appalachia (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.os
mre.gov/resources/newsroom/news/2016/080316.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZ7J-3ZUL]. A
similar study had been funded by USGS in 2013, but it was abruptly cancelled by the agency
in favor of researching the health and environmental effects of hydraulic fracturing that
produces shale gas. Ken Ward, Jr., USGS Halts Research on Mountaintop Removal’s




370 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior Office of Surface Mining Reclamation &
Enforcement, supra note 369.
371 Id.
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been or are being mined or reclaimed for surface coal deposits” in Central
Appalachia.372
However, on August 18, 2017, after the NASEM committee had held
four public hearings and had reached the midway point in the project,
Trump administration officials abruptly ordered it to halt all further
work.373 Shifting explanations were given for termination of the Commit-
tee’s efforts. At first, Department of the Interior claimed it was conducting
372 Project Information: Potential Human Health Effects of Surface Coal Mining Operations
in Central Appalachia, NAT’L ACAD. SCI., ENG’G. & MED. (2017), https://www .nationalaca
demies.org/cp/projectview.aspx?key=49846. The specific agenda of the study included, in
relevant part:
1. Identify and briefly describe the main types of coal deposits in
Central Appalachia that are extracted using surface mining
techniques. Descriptions will include geologic and geochemical
characteristics, mining and reclamation operations, and waste
management approaches.
. . . .
3. Systematically search and screen literature to identify relevant
scientific publications on the potential human health effects re-
lated to surface coal mining operations. The committee will use the
selected literature to accomplish the following:
a. Identify effects from surface coal mining operations on air,
surface water, ground-water, and drinking water quality and
on ecologic communities and soil that could potentially lead to
human health concerns.
b. Evaluate the potential for short-term and long-term human
health effects, which will include consideration of potential
exposure pathways and relevant environmental contaminants
and other stressors.
c. Assess the scientific and methodologic quality, rigor, and suf-
ficiency of the scientific research.
4. Identify baseline data and approaches necessary to monitor envi-
ronmental and human health indicators that may be affected by
surface coal mining operations.
5. Identify gaps in research and needs for additional research that
may assist in the development of new approaches to safeguard the
health of residents living near these types of coal mining operations.
Id.
373 Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Office of Surface Mining Reclamation & Enforce-
ment, to Nat’l Acad. of Sci., Eng’g, & Med. (Aug. 17, 2017), https://thinkprogress.org /trump
-cancels-offshore-study-dfa978234a5c/ [https://perma.cc/Z55X-637X] [hereinafter Letter
to Nat’l Acad. of Sci., Eng’g & Med.]. Interestingly, in December 2017, the Department of
the Interior similarly halted another NASEM study examining “and evaluat[ing how the
Department of the Interior] conducts its inspections of offshore oil and gas operations.”
See Mark Hand, Administration Halts Scientific Study on Offshore Drilling Safety, THINK
PROGRESS (Dec. 22, 2017), https://thinkprogress.org/trump-cancels-offshore-study-dfa97
8234a5c/ [https://perma.cc/ER8T-PTAD].
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a review of grants and cooperative agreements exceeding $100,000 to
confirm that public funds were being used wisely and effectively.374 How-
ever, no other NASEM studies were halted at the time.375 Furthermore,
the Department of the Interior’s Office of Inspector General was unable
to find any information indicating what, if any, criteria the Department
of the Interior used in its claimed review of agency-funded grants and
cooperatives.376 A second reason came in an audit report: “Departmental
officials decided to halt the study because they did not believe it would
produce any new information and felt costs would exceed the benefits.”377
Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) conducted a comprehensive review
of the termination of the NASEM study.378 This comprehensive review was
based upon interviews with NASEM personnel, the chair of the health
study, and public officials, as well as materials produced by the Depart-
ment of the Interior pursuant to Freedom of Information Act requests.379 
HRW’s report reveals there was no actual Department “review”
of the study funding.380 The decision to terminate had been made within
hours, and the top official of the Office of Surface Mining who sent the
August 18, 2017, termination letter had consulted with Kate MacGregor,
a senior political appointee of the Trump administration.381 MacGregor,
according to HRW, had been meeting regularly and in private with coal
industry executives and lobbyists in the months preceding the termina-
tion of the study.382 HRW observed that “the unusual circumstances of
374 See Letter to Nat’l Acad. of Sci., Eng’g & Med., supra note 373. See also Lisa Freidman
& Brad Plumer, Coal Mining Health Study is Halted by the Interior Department, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/21/climate/coal-mining-health
-study-is-halted-by-interior-department.html [https://perma.cc/VUN2-4GRC].
375 See Letter from House Nat. Res. Comm. Ranking Member Raúl Grijalva to U.S.




376 Letter from U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Office of Inspector General, to Ranking Member
Grijalva (June 7, 2018), https://naturalresources.house.gov/imo/media/doc/Unmasked.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QMT9-3ZT2].
377 U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Office of Inspector General, Rep. No. 2017-FIN-024 AUDIT
OF COSTS CLAIMED UNDER NAS COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT WITH OSMRE FOUND NO
ISSUES 1 (Sept. 2018), https://www.doioig.gov/sites/doioig.gov/files/FinalAudit_NASCoop
erativeAgreement_091818.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GA2-NFTX].
378 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 22, at 64–67.
379 Id. at 65–66.
380 Id. at 11.
381 Id. at 64–65.
382 Id. at 66. MacGregor met with Arch Coal and with the National Mining Association.
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the study’s cancelation raise serious concerns about inappropriate politi-
cal interference and industry influence.”383
HRW’s report also documented other efforts by the coal industry
to dispute and undermine epidemiological findings of university researchers
who participated in the research.384 Reminiscent of the strategy and tactics
the coal industry employed to discredit scientific studies linking miners’
respiration of coal dust with black lung disease, coal industry-funded
researchers published several articles disputing the findings of scientific
studies finding correlations between coal mining and degraded health of
nearby residents.385 HRW reported:
In March 2011, just after WVU and other research on moun-
taintop removal began to receive media attention, Virginia
Tech unveiled a new program called the Appalachian Re-
search Initiative for Environmental Studies (ARIES). The
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, Calendars (Oct. 19, 2018), https://psmag.com/environment/a
-top-doi-official-had-at-least-six-meetings-with-the-mining-industry-she-then-helped-can
cel-a-study-on-the-public-health-effects-of-mining [https://perma.cc/F55L-8NTE] (under
“Deputy Assistant Secretary for Lands and Minerals Management Katharine MacGregor”).
HRW also cites Jim Tobias, A Top DOI Official Had at Least Six Meetings with the
Mining Industry. She then Helped Cancel a Study on the Public Health Effects of Mining,
PACIFIC STANDARD (June 11, 2018), https://psmag.com/environment/a-top-doi-official-had
-at-least-six-meetings-with-the-mining-industry-she-then-helped-cancel-a-study-on-the
-public-health-effects-of-mining [https://perma.cc/DNB3-UF3F].
383 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 22, at 65.
384 See Ken Ward, Jr., Does the Coal Industry’s New Report ‘Debunk’ WVU Studies on
Mountaintop Removal and Public Health?, CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL: COAL TATTOO
(Feb. 15, 2012), http://blogs.wvgazettemail.com/coaltattoo/2012/02/15/does-the-coal-indus
trys-new-report-debunk-wvu-studies-on-mountaintop-removal-and-public-health/ [https://
perma.cc/UTH8-9ZFA].
385 See, e.g., Steven H. Lamm et al., Are Residents of Mountaintop-Mining Counties More
Likely to Have Infants with Birth Defects? The West Virginia Experience, 103 CLINICAL
& MOLECULAR TERATOLOGY 76 (Feb. 2015), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/2538
8330 [https://perma.cc/LJ6Q-UN3C] (“The data do not demonstrate evidence of a “Mountain-
top Mining” effect on the prevalence of infants with reported birth defects in WV.”); J.
Borak et al., Mortality disparities in Appalachia: Reassessment of major risk factors, 54
J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 146, 153 (2012) (“Coal mining is not per se an indepen-
dent risk factor for increased mortality in Appalachia. Nevertheless, our results underscore
the substantial economic and cultural disadvantages that adversely impact health in
Appalachia, especially in the coal-mining areas of Central Appalachia”); Hamid Ferdosi
et al., Arsenic in Drinking Water and Lung Cancer Mortality in the United States: An Analy-
sis Based on US Counties and 30 Years of Observation (1950–1979), 2016 J. ENVTL. &
PUB. HEALTH 11 (2016); Hamid Ferdosi et al., Small-For-Gestational Age Prevalence Risk
Factors in Central Appalachian States with Mountain-Top Mining, INT’L J. OCCUPATIONAL
MED. & ENVTL. HEALTH 20 (2018).
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initiative would fund researchers from eight universities,
including West Virginia University, to study the human and
ecological impact of coal. The catch: it was initially funded
entirely by a $15 million grant from coal companies (it
now also receives state funding).386
However, the program states that its research is “independent of the in-
terests of its affiliates” and that it expects researchers to follow the
research integrity policies of their respective universities.387
It is also reported that the coal industry and energy interests
sought to discredit and pressure epidemiological researchers in other
ways. For example, Highland Mining Company used the West Virginia
Freedom of Information Act to request essentially all documents related
to the initiation, preparation, and publication of Professor Michael
Hendryx’s articles that suggest a connection between surface coal mining
and birth defects, cancer, and poor quality of life in the region.388
The University identified over 240,000 documents that were po-
tentially responsive to Highland’s requests and “made five productions
of documents to Highland, producing some 2,364 documents, totaling
11,090 pages.”389 Four of those document productions included a separate
Vaughn index and corresponding affidavit, explaining WVU’s decision to
redact 119 documents and withhold 772 documents.390 The West Virginia
Supreme Court ultimately rejected Highland Coal Company’s broad
request seeking Professor Hendryx’s research notes and correspondence
with other scholars generated in the course of his research and preparation
386 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 22, at 70.
387 See About Appalachian Research Initiative for Environmental Science (ARIES), VA.
POLYTECHNIC INST. & STATE UNIV., https://www.research.uky.edu/office-sponsored-proj
ects-administration/industry-sponsored-agreements [https://perma.cc /HQB8-DHF4] (last
visited Apr. 3, 2019) (initial funders of ARIES included Alpha Natural Resources, Inter-
national Coal Group, Massey Energy, Natural Resource Partners, TECO Coal Corporation,
Patriot Coal Corporation, Cliffs Natural Resources, Mepco, CSX Corporation, and Norfolk
Southern). HRW also reported ARIES’ project director stated that industry funders
“would not have a role in selecting specific projects” for funding and they may not “dictate
research methodology.” He did not, however, respond to a written inquiry asking whether
the program’s corporate funders may communicate with researchers, “a practice that is
not only permitted but encouraged by the integrity policy at least one of the universities af-
filiated with ARIES.” See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 22, at 70 (citing Industry
Sponsored Agreements, UNIV. OF KY., https://www.research.uky.edu/office-sponsored-proj
ects-administration/industry-sponsored-agreements [https://perma.cc/8QAB-GQPN]).
388 See Zullig & Hendryx, supra note 348, at 852.
389 Highland Mining Co. v. W. Va. Univ. School of Med., 774 S.E.2d 36, 44 (2015).
390 Id.
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for drafting a final report.391 The entire process, including litigation, con-
sumed thirty-nine months.392
Also troubling is the appearance that University officials were
pressured, and in turn pressured Professor Hendryx’s supervisor, to dis-
courage and disavow the faculty member’s epidemiological research.393 In
an interview, Hendryx denied he was ever directly pressured by West
Virginia University to end his research.394 However, he explained that he
“knew there was tension and that they were super concerned and ner-
vous about it.”395 He left the University for a position at Indiana Univer-
sity.396 Before he moved on, Hendryx described meetings with journalists
during which “someone from their media office sat in . . . to keep an eye
on [him].”397
Moreover, the Acting Dean of WVU’s School of Public Health—
where Hendryx was a faculty member—told HRW that “[i]t was very
clear that the WVU administration was getting feedback from industry[,]
which is a major funder.”398 The Dean felt growing concern “when people
connected with the university warned him that [his own] ‘leadership po-
sition was in jeopardy’ due to [Hendryx’s] research.”399
391 Id. at 52–53 (“Because these drafts, data compilations and analyses, proposed edits,
e-mails and other communications, and peer review comments and responses relate to
the planning, preparation and editing necessary to produce a final published article, they
are exempt from disclosure.”).
392 The West Virginia Court held that any document that reveals a scholar’s analysis under-
lying a published article is predecisional, and that all prepublication documents relating
to a published scientific research article are, by their very nature, predecisional. Documents
are deliberative if they expose “the give-and-take of a professor’s scientific research con-
sultative process” that reveal how the “researcher[ ] evaluate[d] possible alternative out-
comes.” The court held exempted from disclosure “drafts, data compilations and analyses,
proposed edits, e-mails and other communications, and peer review comments and re-
sponses relate[d] to the planning, preparation and editing necessary to produce a final
published article.” Id.
393 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 22, at 67–68.
394 Id.
395 Id.
396 Id. at 68; see also Michael Shawn Hendryx, INDIANA SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, https://
info.publichealth.indiana.edu/faculty/current/hendryx-michael.shtml [https://perma.cc
/TM96-XH5N] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019).
397 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 22, at 68.
398 Id.
399 Id. Also disquieting was the October 2011 request made by a university public relations
official to an environmental reporter of the Charleston Gazette-Mail to refrain from calling
studies by university faculty “WVU studies” since it “could be interpreted as the institution
taking a position.” Id. (citing Ken Ward Jr., WVU Tries to Distance Itself from Faculty
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CONCLUSION
Even as medical researchers warn of an insidious increase in
black lung disease among both underground and surface coal miners in
the Appalachian coalfields, nascent peer-reviewed studies of epidemiolo-
gists and other researchers have found extremely worrisome correlations
between externalized pollution from large-scale (MTR) coal mining op-
erations and the health of those who live in nearby communities.
Like the connection between respirable dust generated in coal
mines and black lung disease, the environmental harm that accrues from
coal mining in Appalachia during the last century has been thoroughly
and extensively documented. However, until the last decade, similar
studies and analysis of the impact of coal mining on the health of those
who work in or reside near the mines has received little scrutiny. Gener-
ally, these new studies have focused on cardiopulmonary, cancer, repro-
duction, mortality, and general health status (self-reported illness and
serious illness) by examining exposures from pollutants externalized to
surrounding communities by MTR mining: impact on air quality, drink-
ing water, water chemistry/quality, and the aquatic ecosystem.
The coal industry’s response to these new studies is reminiscent of
its disputation of scientific evidence, denial of responsibility, and efforts
to minimize the extent of occupational health impacts of respirable dust
causing black lung disease. Whether the recent studies documenting cor-
relation between the polluting externalities of coal mining operations and
adverse public health outcomes will lead researchers to find causation as
well as correlation must await additional research and analysis. How-
ever, these attacks on findings signal continuing marginalization of, and
disrespect for, coalfield communities and the people whose dangerous,
arduous work and sacrifice powered the nation for more than a century.
Sadly, despite its natural resource wealth, Central Appalachia has
long suffered from poverty, lack of adequate public services, and a dearth
of educational and employment opportunities. Likewise, healthcare in
the region has been viewed as problematic—for decades before the recent
studies identifying serious health issues plaguing communities located
near coal mines. While coal industry managers, civic leaders, and politi-
cians of every stripe have long professed their concerns—even love—for coal
Research, CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL: COAL TATTOO (Oct. 7, 2011), http://blogs.wvgazette
mail.com/coaltattoo/2011/10/07/wvu-tries-to-distance-itself-from-faculty-research/
[https://perma.cc/9BYP-XW27]).
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miners, their families, and their communities, these sentiments are belied
by the failure to address these long-standing issues. Because “causation”
has not yet been affirmatively established by multiple scientific studies
is not, however, an excuse to do nothing.400 One is left to ask: for how long
must coalfield communities continue to “yield to the necessities of a great
public industry”?401
400 See Sir Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association or Causation?,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOC’Y OF MED. 12 (Jan. 14, 1965), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih
.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1898525/pdf/procrsmed00196-0010.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6UA
-E9V5] (“All scientific work is incomplete—whether it be observational or experimental.
All scientific work is liable to be upset or modified by advancing knowledge. This does not
confer upon us a freedom to ignore the knowledge we already have, or to postpone the
action that it appears to demand at a given time”).
401 Pa. Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 149 (1886). See discussion supra at note 10 and
accompanying text.

